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COEQUAL FEDERALISM AND FEDERAL-
STATE AGENCIES 
Dave Owen* & Hannah J. Wiseman† 
 
Dividing authority between the federal government and the 
states is central to the theory and practice of federalism. 
Division is the defining feature of dual federalism, which 
dominates the U.S. Supreme Court’s federalism 
jurisprudence. Recent academic theories of federalism 
emphasize overlap and interaction but still assume that 
federal and state actors will work within separate institutions. 
Each approach can be problematic, yet assumptions of 
separation remain the bedrock of federalism. This Article 
discusses a different form of federalism: coequal federalism. 
Under coequal federalism, federal- and state-appointed 
officials collaborate within a single agency that makes 
decisions binding on the federal government and the states. 
This form of federalism exists only within obscure niches of 
American governance, and it is largely absent from theoretical 
discussions. We argue that it should receive more extensive 
attention and use. We also explain how coequal federalism can 
function in practice, when it will offer a desirable alternative 
to more traditional approaches, and why it is constitutional. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Dividing authority between the federal government and states 
presents, in the U.S. Supreme Court’s apt words, “perhaps our 
oldest question of constitutional law.”1 As both federal and state 
governments have grown, that question also has become centrally 
important to administrative law.2 In fields ranging from health 
care to energy, deciding how to allocate power among federal and 
state agencies is a pervasive and exceedingly contentious 
challenge.3 
Broadly speaking, the traditional responses to that challenge, 
both in practice and in the literature, fit into two categories of 
federalism. One approach—dual federalism—assigns exclusive 
authority to federal or state agencies.4 The other approach gives 
federal and state agencies overlapping authority, which they may 
exercise either in coordination—an approach often called 
 
1 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). For one of the earliest 
instantiations of this challenge, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 326 (1819), which 
observed that “[t]he people of the United States have seen fit to divide sovereignty, and to 
establish a complex system,” and that, within this system, “it was easy to foresee that 
question must arise between” the powers conferred on state governments and the national 
government. A related and intriguing question—which, for reasons of brevity, this Article 
does not address—is whether and how local governments might become involved in joint 
administrative governance that also involves the federal and state governments. 
2 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 
2023, 2025–28 (2008) (discussing the Court’s invocation of federalism questions when 
addressing Chevron deference to federal agencies’ interpretation of statutes); Frank R. 
Strong, The Future of Federalism in the United States, 22 TEX. L. REV. 255, 275 (1944) 
(providing early recognition of “administrative federalism” and its “significant application in 
governmental practice”). 
3 See, e.g., Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 
767 (2016) (considering the boundaries of federal and state authority over energy pricing); 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 532–34 (2012) (considering the 
boundaries of federal authority over healthcare regulation). 
4 See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 
243, 246 (2005) (“Dual federalism refers to the concept that the state and national 
governments enjoy exclusive and non-overlapping spheres of authority.”). Although dual 
federalism has been declared “dead” by many scholars, it stubbornly remains in modern 
legal doctrine. See, e.g., id. (proclaiming that “[d]ual federalism is dead”). For continued 
line-drawing between state and federal authority, see Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 
1476 (2018), which struck down a federal law that prohibited states from authorizing sports 
gambling because Congress lacks “the power to issue direct orders to the governments of 
the States.”  
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cooperative federalism—or independently.5 Both independent and 
overlapping authority systems are common and have been 
extensively theorized.6 Both have achieved some success, but they 
have also created deep-seated problems. Dual federalism offers 
simplicity and preserves some values associated with federal or 
state primacy, but it also often subordinates important national or 
state interests.7 Drawing sensible lines between federal and state 
zones of authority can be extraordinarily difficult, particularly in a 
nation where complex policy issues rarely align neatly with one 
level of governance.8 Overlapping governance only partially 
 
5 See Schapiro, supra note 4, at 250 (noting that in cooperative federalism, “[t]he state 
and federal governments do not enjoy mutually exclusive and non-overlapping areas of 
power”). The benefits and challenges of multiple-federal-agency management have received 
extensive attention in recent literature, but our analysis leaves those questions largely to 
the side. See, e.g., Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 213 (2015) 
(discussing how agencies can pool powers “to combine one agency’s expertise with legal 
authority allocated to another”); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared 
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1138 (2012) (commenting on the challenges and 
benefits of federal jurisdictional areas in which two or more agencies exercise regulatory 
control).  
6 The federalism canon is massive, but some of the prominent explorations, critiques, 
praise for, and theories of dual and cooperative federalism include ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, 
POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 55 (2009) 
(describing “dualist” federalism); William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, 
Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1550 (2007) 
(describing the tension between traditional dual federalism and the emergence of 
overlapping governance structures, known as “cooperative” or “delegated program” 
federalism); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 231–32 (2000) (critiquing 
judicial and theoretical approaches to preemption theory); and Edward S. Corwin, The 
Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1950) (arguing that dual federalism no 
longer accurately describes governance regimes).  
7 For a discussion of how dual sovereignty still dominates legal doctrine, see, for example, 
ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 3–4 (2011). A recent example of the 
subordination of state interests is the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s 
(NHTSA’s) and Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) regulation that withdrew states’ 
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from cars. See Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief at 4, California v. Chao, No. 1:19-cv-02826 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2019) 
(showing twenty-three states’ challenge to the NHTSA and EPA regulation). 
8 See, e.g., Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 
STAN. L. REV. 289, 294 (2012) (exploring the complex relationships among federal agencies 
and between federal agencies and local government actors in the national security context); 
Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. 
L. REV. 567, 571 (2008) (arguing that the “federal government, the states, and localities 
form part of an integrated regulatory structure” and that immigration federalism 
scholarship ignores this complexity). 
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resolves these issues and presents its own challenges. While 
overlap brings more interests into decisionmaking processes and 
avoids stripping one governmental level of authority, it can result 
in confusion, delay, and conflicting decisions.9 
Many potential examples of these challenges exist, but we start 
with just one. A successful energy and climate policy likely will 
depend on developing new electric transmission lines, which would 
deliver electricity—largely renewable—from the Great Plains and 
the southwest to population centers further east and west.10 A 
dual federalism approach, in which either the federal government 
or states have exclusive authority, would not be ideal for siting 
these lines because it would ignore either state interests in 
managing major land uses or federal interests in managing an 
international electrical grid. Cooperative federalism also would not 
be ideal because it envisions separate state-by-state 
decisionmaking, and transmission lines would have little value if 
adjacent states failed to ensure that transmission aligned at state 
borders. A system of uncoordinated overlap also would not make 
sense because it would involve serial, and potentially conflicting, 
approval processes for each transmission line. Consequently, here, 
and in other policy realms with similar characteristics, a different 
governance approach is needed.11 
Because of the limitations of cooperative federalism and 
independent approaches, this Article discusses a third, distinct 
form of federalism: coequal federal-state authority exercised 
through joint agencies. Rather than relegating governance to one 
 
9 See, e.g., Daniel P. Selmi, Themes in the Evolution of the State Environmental Policy 
Acts, 38 URB. LAW. 949, 962–63 (2006) (noting “consistent criticism” of the need to duplicate 
environmental analyses under state and federal law and that, although states have 
attempted to coordinate review processes to avoid duplication, “these efforts toward 
administrative efficiency often fail”); Hannah J. Wiseman, Delegation and Dysfunction, 35 
YALE J. ON REG. 233, 240–45 (2018) (describing agency costs associated with cooperative 
federalism, including principal-agent problems). Overlapping authority can also result in 
inaction when one entity assumes that another entity is addressing the problem. See 
William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 6–14 (2003) (noting that when multiple entities have only partial 
jurisdiction over a widespread problem, a “regulatory commons” can emerge in which there 
is “political underinvestment” in the problem).  
10 See Alexandra B. Klass, Future-Proofing Energy Transport Law, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 
827, 847 (2017) (“New, long-distance electric transmission lines are critical to expand the 
use of renewable energy for electricity and to reduce reliance on fossil fuels.”). 
11 See infra Section III.F.1. 
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level or envisioning separate and semi-coordinated federal and 
state decisionmaking, this approach involves joint federal and 
state action within a single administrative agency. This federal-
state agency would be created—and its responsibilities defined—
by federal and state legislation, with at least one state 
participating. A multi-member commission with federal and state 
appointees would oversee the agency’s affairs, with that 
commission supported by a dedicated agency staff. Participation in 
the agency would be voluntary: neither the states nor the federal 
government could order one another to join, and either could 
withdraw from participation. But so long as the agency continued 
to be active, it could issue rules and orders that bound federal and 
participating-state officials and private actors. 
Versions of coequal federalism exist, but only in obscure niches 
of American governance—none of which have demonstrated the 
full potential of this governance form.12 The Compact Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to approve interstate 
compacts, and some interstate compacts create agencies, a few of 
which have federal participation.13 But only a few of these entities 
currently operate—they handle tasks like governing water 
management in a few interstate rivers14 and managing the Reagan 
 
12 See infra notes 171–189 and accompanying text (explaining why interstate river basin 
management poses challenges for joint federal-state governance). 
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . 
enter into any agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”). 
14 See, e.g., About DRBC, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMMISSION, 
https://www.state.nj.us/drbc/about/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (explaining the history of 
the Delaware River Basin Commission and its role in managing, protecting, and improving 
the basin’s water resources); About Us, SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMMISSION, 
https://www.srbc.net/about/about-us/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing the history, 
structure, and goals of the Susquehanna River Basin Commission); UPPER COLO. RIVER 
COMMISSION, http://www.ucrcommission.com/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing the 
organization, history, and responsibilities of the Upper Colorado River Commission); About 
Us, OHIO RIVER VALLEY WATER SANITATION COMMISSION, http://www.orsanco.org/about-us/ 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission’s 
role in improving the water quality of the Ohio River and its tributaries); cf. New Jersey v. 
New York, 347 U.S. 995, 996–1001 (1954) (addressing a water dispute among four states 
and New York City, and determining water allocations); 1954 U.S. Supreme Court Decree, 
DEL. RIVER BASIN COMMISSION, https://www.nj.gov/drbc/programs/flow/decree.html (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2020) (describing legislation in which the four states that were parties to the 
suit and the United States formed a compact to govern water allocation). 
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National and Dulles airports15—and none of them are particularly 
prominent. Aside from these limited examples, giving federal-state 
agencies significant authority to regulate and bind the federal 
government and participating states would be new to American 
governance.16  
Discussion of coequal federalism is largely new to the 
literature.17 Even the dynamic federalism18 and nationalist 
 
15 About the Airports Authority, METROPOLITAN WASH. AIRPORTS AUTHORITY, 
https://www.mwaa.com/about/about-airports-authority (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) 
(discussing the mission and governance of the Airports Authority). 
16 A somewhat analogous arrangement is common in law enforcement, where federal 
agents often form joint task forces with their state or local counterparts. But these 
arrangements are typically ad hoc, temporary, and involve state or local officials who 
voluntarily serve within a federal command structure. See JEROME P. BJELOPERA & KRISTIN 
FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43583, DOMESTIC FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
COORDINATION: THROUGH THE LENS OF THE SOUTHWEST BORDER 2–6 (2014) (documenting 
numerous federal-state-local “investigative operations” through voluntary task forces and 
information-sharing “fusion centers” to combat drug trafficking and other crimes). The 
combination of joint structures and secrecy also can create transparency problems that 
might not occur in other realms. See also Susan N. Herman, Collapsing Spheres: Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces, Federalism, and the War on Terror, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 941, 
943 (2005) (explaining how joint task forces can disrupt local government and shift 
policymaking authority to the Executive Branch “where accountability and transparency 
are minimized”). 
17 But see MARTHA DERTHICK, BETWEEN STATE AND NATION: REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
OF THE UNITED STATES 49–52, 66–67 (1974) (discussing the challenges the Delaware River 
Basin Authority faced in its early years). 
18 The “dynamic federalism” literature explores, and often supports, forms of shared 
federal-state authority, but not formal, joint authority. See David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. 
Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory 
Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1799 (2008) (drawing on dynamic federalism legal 
scholarship and asserting that “the initiative to address environmental problems will 
originate from more than one level of government based upon a variety of political, 
socioeconomic, and environmental factors . . . .”); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and 
Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (2009) (focusing on “schemes of federalism 
where federal law consciously designates a particular and distinct state or group of states to 
regulate and relies on that regulatory arrangement to enhance compliance with federal 
standards”); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in 
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 161 (2006) (rejecting the assumption that 
regulatory authority “should be allocated to one or the other level of government with 
minimal overlap”); Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2011) 
(describing how state and federal actors often bargain above the formal cooperative 
federalism framework); Schapiro, supra note 4, at 285 (advocating for a “polyphonic 
conception” of federalism “characterized by the existence of multiple, independent sources of 
political authority”). 
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federalism literatures,19 which move the federalism debate far 
beyond the confines of traditional dual or even cooperative 
federalism, lack an account of coequal federal-state governance. 
This Article constructs that account. It explains what coequal 
federalism is and why it deserves more theoretical exploration and 
real-world use. The primary arguments for coequal federalism are 
straightforward: it limits the line-drawing and subordination 
problems associated with federalism theories grounded in 
separation of power, and it reduces the coordination challenges 
that arise from overlapping federalism. More generally, coequal 
federalism addresses a problem largely glossed over by recent 
federalism theory, which often celebrates federal-state overlap 
without explaining the governance structures that will generate 
successful collaborations instead of disorganization, conflict, and 
delay. Joint federal-state administration would not make sense in 
all circumstances, so we frame conditions under which it could be 
most effective.20 Forming a new joint federal-state agency also 
could be politically difficult, particularly at a time when state and 
federal officials often seem to relish separation and 
disagreement.21 But even with these caveats, coequal federalism 
deserves more attention.  
 
19 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 
YALE L.J. 1889, 1890 (2014) (describing how federalism is now “deeply nationalist in 
character”); Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 2002 (2014) 
(developing the account of “Congress as our primary source of federalism” through federal 
mandates that deeply involve the states in their implementation). The dynamic federalism 
and nationalist federalism literatures overlap. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. 
Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1271–84 (2009) (discussing how 
cooperative federalism systems can facilitate productive disagreement when states refuse to 
comply with federal directives or challenge them in other ways); Abbe R. Gluck, 
Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal 
Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 585–89 (2011) (providing examples 
that defy traditional federalism structures); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict 
Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2097 
(2014) (discussing the benefits of shared governance through cooperative federalism). 
20 See infra Section III.F. 
21 See Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of 
Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 47 (2018) (noting that state lawsuits against the federal 
government have “grown in volume and prominence”); Elbert Lin, States Suing the Federal 
Government: Protecting Liberty or Playing Politics?, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 633, 634–46 (2018) 
(describing state-federal legal clashes). 
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Nevertheless, even in contexts where it otherwise makes policy 
sense, joint federal-state governance may generate legal 
challenges, some grounded in the U.S. Constitution. Creating a 
joint federal-state agency would generate questions about dormant 
Commerce Clause authority,22 the delegation doctrine,23 the 
vesting of executive authority in the President,24 the anti-
commandeering doctrine,25 and appointment and removal 
authority,26 as well as questions of state constitutional law.27 Some 
of these issues are relatively straightforward, but some are 
thorny.28 More generally, joint state-federal governance might 
seem at odds with broader constitutional principles. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he Constitution requires a 
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly 
local,”29 and such separations ostensibly preserve the autonomy of 
the states and protect the public from overly powerful governance 
entities.30 This concept, if taken far enough, could preclude the 
creation of a joint governance entity and may call into question the 
few federal-state entities that already operate.31 Federal-state 
entities were formed well before the resurgences of formalism and 
dual federalism that define much of the modern Court’s 
 
22 See infra Section IV.A. 
23 See infra Section IV.C. 
24 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America.”); see id. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”). 
25 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997) (noting that state officers cannot 
be “‘dragooned’ . . . into administering federal law” (citation omitted)); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992) (holding that two provisions of a congressional act would 
“‘commandeer’ state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would 
. . . be inconsistent with the Constitution’s division of authority between federal and state 
governments”). 
26 See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2 (granting the Executive the power to appoint “Officers of the 
United States”). 
27 See, e.g., West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 24–25, 32 (1951) (granting 
West Virginia’s request for a writ of mandamus ordering the state’s treasurer to provide 
funds to the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission). 
28 The most straightforward issues involve state constitutional law and the dormant 
Commerce Clause. See infra notes 209, 222, & 249–252 and accompanying text. 
29 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000). 
30 See infra notes 317–319 and accompanying text. 
31 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, Kerpen v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 140 
S. Ct. 132 (2019) (mem.) (No. 18-1240) (arguing that the authority of a federal-state entity 
occupies an unconstitutional “delegation twilight zone”). 
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jurisprudence, and litigants drawing upon the Court’s recent 
jurisprudence are already questioning whether these entities 
should even exist.32 
We conclude, however, that this governance approach is 
constitutional. While federalism rhetoric often celebrates division, 
constitutional principles and precedent support—or at least 
permit—integrative and innovative governance structures.33 And 
while some U.S. Supreme Court holdings, if taken to their 
extremes, might suggest that a joint agency would face 
insurmountable problems with delegation, appointment, removal, 
or commandeering, the U.S. Constitution’s text contains no bar on 
federal-state agencies; taking prior holdings to their extremes does 
not make sense either as textual interpretation or as structural 
reasoning.34 An enterprising litigant could cobble together a 
superficially compelling brief filled with statements casting doubt 
on a joint federal-state agency, but that brief ultimately should fail 
to persuade. 
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part II sets forth a basic 
blueprint for a joint federal-state agency and describes how it 
would operate. Part III explains why such agencies are desirable. 
It discusses the centrality of federal-state divisions to both 
constitutional and administrative law, describes traditional 
responses—both theoretical and practical—to the challenges of 
dividing authority, and explains how those traditional responses 
fall short. More generally, Part III explains how recent federalism 
scholarship, though greatly enamored with overlapping federal 
and state authority, provides underdeveloped accounts of the 
doctrines, procedures, and institutional structures that should 
operate in zones of overlap, and thus shows how our proposal 
advances a broader theoretical debate. Finally, Part III uses two 
concrete policy challenges—interstate electric transmission line 
siting and interstate river management—to illustrate conditions in 
which joint federal-state governance makes sense and when it is 
likely to struggle. Part IV then addresses the constitutional 
 
32 See, e.g., Kerpen v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 907 F.3d 152, 160–63 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(examining the constitutionality of the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority—an 
independent entity created with the consent of the federal government through an 
interstate compact), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 132 (2019) (mem.). 
33 See infra Section IV.D. 
34 See infra Sections IV.A–IV.C. 
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questions that existing and new joint, federal-state agencies would 
likely raise. We conclude that while a joint federal-state agency 
would likely trigger important constitutional questions, neither 
constitutional text nor principles should bar its creation. Instead, 
coequal federalism would honor and advance those constitutional 
principles. 
II. A BLUEPRINT FOR JOINT FEDERAL-STATE GOVERNANCE  
Before discussing the normative and constitutional contours of 
joint federal-state governance, a more concrete description of this 
branch of federalism is in order. Accordingly, this Part 
summarizes characteristics of this form of governance. It begins 
with general features before turning to specific features of agency 
design. While we sometimes use characteristics of existing federal-
state agencies as examples, our goal is to explain an idealized 
structure, not to describe the few joint agencies that already 
operate. 
A. THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF FEDERAL-STATE GOVERNANCE  
Two key features differentiate joint federal-state governance 
from dual federalism, cooperative federalism, and systems in 
which federal and state agencies each independently exercise 
authority. First, joint federal-state governance does not separate 
spheres of federal and state responsibility. That contrasts with 
dual federalism, for which separate spheres are a defining trait.35 
Even cooperative federalism emphasizes division, though the 
divisions typically focus on tasks rather than on the subject matter 
of governance.36 For example, under traditional delegated 
cooperative governance, the federal government often sets national 
standards—such as national limits on air pollution 
concentrations—and the states then implement regulatory 
programs that must meet these standards.37 No such division 
 
35 See infra Section III.A. 
36 See infra notes 106–110 and accompanying text. 
37 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409–10 (2012) (establishing national air quality standards and 
requiring states to develop state implementation plans to achieve these standards). 
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exists in a joint federal-state system, which would unify 
responsibility within a single agency.38 
Second, in joint federal-state governance, a single agency exerts 
binding regulatory authority over the federal government and 
participating states. For example, in existing water compacts, 
federal agencies operating in the basin covered by the compact 
may not spend money on water projects without first having those 
projects included in the compact commission’s plan for the basin.39 
This contrasts with dual governance schemes, in which states 
either must accede to federal directives or exercise autonomous 
control free of federal intervention.40 It also contrasts with 
cooperative federalism systems, in which federal mandates 
subordinate state decisionmaking.41 
B. THE MECHANICS OF FEDERAL-STATE GOVERNANCE  
The preceding general description of coequal governance raises 
many specific questions about how a joint federal-state agency 
would operate. The discussion below addresses these more specific 
questions. 
1. Participation. Truly joint federal-state governance must take 
place through a distinct institution, which we assume would be an 
administrative agency. This agency requires the participation of 
 
38 Additionally, federal-state dialogue in coequal governance would occur within one 
administrative entity rather than between federal and state entities. 
39 See Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, § 11.1(b), 75 Stat. 688, 701 
(1961) (“No expenditure or commitment shall be made for or on account of the construction, 
acquisition or operation of any project or facility nor shall it be deemed authorized, unless it 
shall have first been included by the commission in the comprehensive plan . . . .”). These 
agencies also have the authority to, and sometimes do, set both water quality standards and 
implement regulations to achieve these standards. See, e.g., DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, 
NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS §7.1(a)–(d) (2011), https://www.nj.gov/drbc/ 
library/documents/naturalgas-REVISEDdraftregs110811.pdf (proposing detailed rules 
limiting stormwater runoff and other pollution from hydraulically fractured gas well sites 
within the Delaware River Basin—a proposal later replaced by a resolution to ban hydraulic 
fracturing within the Basin). For the proposed rule by the Delaware River Basin 
Commission to ban hydraulic fracturing within the Basin, see Administrative Manual and 
Special Regulations Regarding Natural Gas Development Activities; Additional Clarifying 
Amendments, 83 Fed. Reg. 1586, 1586–1591 (proposed Jan. 12, 2018) (to be codified at 18 
C.F.R. pt. 401 and 440).  
40 See infra Sections III.A– III.B. 
41 See infra Sections III.C– III.D. 
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the federal government and at least one state. That could be the 
extent of the agency’s membership, or it could involve multiple 
participating states and representatives from multiple federal 
agencies. 
The choice between one state and multiple states likely does not 
have important constitutional implications, but it may impact the 
agency’s political viability, practical manageability, and efficacy. If 
an agency has more participating states, the challenges of creating 
aligned, organic legislation will be greater. Similarly, management 
may become unwieldy, particularly if each participating state 
wants representation on the governing board. But an entity that 
involves more states also may more effectively reach solutions that 
integrate interests across a broad geographic range. 
2. Legislative Creation. All agencies, including joint federal-
state agencies, owe their existence to legislation.42 Because the 
federal government cannot command state agency participation in 
a joint agency,43 and the states likewise cannot command the 
federal government’s participation,44 a joint federal-state agency’s 
creation would require consistent legislation from each 
participating government. Either the federal government or the 
states could use later legislation to withdraw from the agency.45 
 
42 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297 (2013) (“Both [agencies’] power to 
act and how they are to act are authoritatively prescribed by Congress . . . .”). 
43 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that federal law cannot 
commandeer state officials, “or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce 
a federal regulatory program”). 
44 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing the Constitution to be the “supreme Law of 
the Land,” necessarily subordinating states). 
45 An interesting question is the extent to which the terms of a compact could impose 
penalties for state withdrawal or provide a withdrawal period. Such terms would limit 
states’ ability to obtain leverage during proceedings by threatening to withdraw or negate 
undesired orders through immediate withdrawals. Legislative withdrawals from compacts 
appear somewhat rare. Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey withdrew from the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative under a Memorandum of Understanding among the states 
allowing states to provide thirty days of notice and then withdraw, but New Jersey’s 
legislation and administrative rules implementing RGGI remained on the books. See Julia 
Ciardullo, New Jersey Governor Announces Withdrawal from RGGI, COLUMBIA CLIMATE 
LAW BLOG (June 3, 2011), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2011/06/03/new-
jersey-governor-announces-withdrawal-from-rggi/. Governor Christie also vetoed three 
subsequent bills that would have required New Jersey’s participation in RGGI. See Tom 
Johnson, Christie Rejects Bill to Rejoin RGGI, for Third (and Last) Time, NJ SPOTLIGHT 
(July 14, 2017), https://www.njspotlight.com/2017/07/17-07-13-christie-rejects-bill-to-rejoin-
rggi-for-third-and-last-time/. 
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Existing compact agencies demonstrate multiple ways to create 
a joint federal-state agency. For example, the federal government 
could first enact legislation, and states that wish to participate 
could copy that legislation and enact it as state law.46 Some 
compact agencies have evolved in this way, with the federal 
government providing pre-approval for compacts aligned with a 
congressionally enacted template.47 Alternatively, a group of 
participating states could negotiate a compact, enact it through 
their legislatures, and ask the federal government to enact 
legislation with similar language.48 Finally, bilateral or 
multilateral negotiations could hammer out the language that all 
participating legislatures then pass.49 
For any joint federal-state agency, additional questions would 
arise regarding the applicability of other federal and state laws not 
directed at the creation of the agency. Most existing federal and 
state agencies are bound not just by their organic statutes but also 
by generally applicable laws (the Administrative Procedure Act50 is 
the most prominent example). The agency’s authorizing legislation 
could resolve many of those questions. Like legislation establishing 
the authority of wholly federal or wholly state agencies, legislation 
establishing federal-state agencies could incorporate other 
statutory requirements or explicitly exempt the agency from those 
requirements. Courts would then resolve other lingering questions 
with traditional tools of statutory interpretation. 
3. Membership. A joint agency’s authorizing legislation also 
would need to specify the structure of agency leadership. Agencies 
typically are headed either by a single person51 or a multi-member 
 
46 See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 441 (1981) (“Congress may consent to an interstate 
compact by authorizing joint state action in advance or by giving expressed or implied 
approval to an agreement the States have already joined.”). 
47 See, e.g., id. (explaining how the Crime Control Consent Act of 1934 provided this sort 
of advance authorization). 
48 See Note, Charting No Man’s Land: Applying Jurisdictional and Choice of Law 
Doctrines to Interstate Compacts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (1998) (“Congress consents 
to compacts by a statute or a joint resolution, which usually includes the compact’s terms.”). 
49 See id. (“From colonial times until the 1930s, parties to a compact usually negotiated 
through joint commissions.”). 
50 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–706 (2018). 
51 See, e.g., Leadership, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/leadership (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2020) (outlining the Department of Energy’s leadership structure, which 
includes one presiding Secretary). 
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commission.52 While the former approach is used at both federal 
and state levels, we know of no example of its use for a joint 
federal-state agency, and likely for good reason: a multi-member 
commission allows for both federal and state representation within 
the agency’s governing body.53 For example, an energy agency 
involving three states and the federal government might be run by 
a five-member commission, with each state appointing one 
commissioner and the federal government appointing two.54 The 
few federal-state agencies that exist tend to have a similar 
structure, although with less federal involvement; for example, the 
Delaware River Basin Commission has four state representatives 
and one federal member,55 and the Susquehanna River Basin 
Commission has three state representatives and one federal 
member.56 Each commission appoints or elects one representative 
to serve as the commission chair.57 
No standard formula for choosing the total number of 
commissioners would be necessary, but odd numbers of 
commissioners generally avoid the problem of tied votes.58 Nor 
would a standard formula for allocating appointments between 
federal and state members be necessary. Several factors might 
 
52 See, e.g., Commission Members and Senior Staff, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, 
https://www.ferc.gov/about/commission-members-senior-staff/commission-members-and-
senior-staff (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) (describing FERC’s twenty-three person membership 
structure).  
53 An agency headed by a single person would raise additional constitutional questions, 
particularly if the agency head were in any way insulated from presidential termination. 
See Seila Law L.L.C. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020) 
(distinguishing single-head from multi-head agencies and holding that “an independent 
agency that wields significant executive power and is run by a single individual who cannot 
be removed by the President unless certain statutory criteria are met” violates the 
separation of powers). 
54 See, e.g., Commissioners, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMMISSION, 
https://www.nj.gov/drbc/about/commissioners/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) (showing a 
somewhat similar example in which four state governors and one federal representative 
from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers make up the commission).  
55 See id. 
56 See Commissioners, SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMMISSION, 
https://www.srbc.net/about/commissioners/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2020). 
57 See id.; Commissioners, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMMISSION, supra note 54. 
58 There would be no problem with ties if the agency makes decisions by consensus. An 
organization that makes consensus-based decisions would raise fewer political objections 
and constitutional concerns, and its members might have stronger incentives to reach 
negotiated solutions, but it could also be more vulnerable to impasses. 
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inform these choices, such as the extent to which the commission 
should favor federal or state interests, and the extent to which it 
should favor particular states. If the commission’s jurisdiction 
includes all of one state but only a small, lightly populated portion 
of another, equal state representation may be inappropriate. 
Similarly, the number of federally appointed commissioners could 
vary depending upon the perceived strength of the national 
interests before the agency.59 The other key consideration is how 
many commissioners the agency can accommodate while still 
engaging in deliberative decisionmaking. A large commission may 
be too unwieldy. 
Commissioners could be appointed through a variety of 
mechanisms. At the federal level, commissioners must be 
appointed either by the President, by the heads of departments, or 
by courts.60 States may have similar requirements. For example, in 
interstate compact commissions that control water quantity and 
quality, state governors serve as members of the commission and 
appoint alternative commissioners from their respective state 
environmental agencies.61 For agencies involving large numbers of 
states, alternative mechanisms—perhaps involving state 
nominations of potential commissioners and then votes by the 
participating states—might need to substitute for direct 
appointments to avoid overly large, cumbersome commissions. 
The terms and removability of agency heads could be handled 
in a variety of ways, but our discussion assumes that 
commissioners would serve for fixed terms unless they are 
removed by the same entity that initially appointment them. 
 
59 Politics would also matter, of course. 
60 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Officers of the United States . . . but the 
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, 
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”). 
Appointment by courts or department heads would be lawful only if the commission heads 
were inferior officers. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–64 (1997) 
(differentiating between principal and inferior officers); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 
670 (1988) (noting that while principal officers must be appointed by the President alone 
and confirmed by the Senate, inferior officers may be appointed by the President, the heads 
of departments, or the judiciary, without Senate approval). 
61 See, e.g., About DRBC, supra note 14 (noting that the governors select “high-ranking 
officials from their state environmental agencies” to serve as commissioners); 
Commissioners, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMMISSION, supra note 54 (showing governor members 
and the alternate commissioners). 
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4. Staffing and Funding. Agency commissions need support 
staff, and these positions need funding. Because joint federal-state 
agencies might replace numerous, disparate, and overlapping 
preexisting agencies, their staff needs can be substantial.62 The 
staffing of a joint federal-state agency could occur in numerous 
ways. Costs could be split, or the federal government, as an 
inducement to state participation, might shoulder most or all of 
the burden.63 In some circumstances, staff already employed by 
federal or state agencies could also serve the federal-state agency. 
This already occurs for some compact agencies without federal 
agency membership. For example, the Interstate Commission for 
Juveniles, which administers the interstate compact by the same 
name and addresses child custody and runaway issues across state 
borders, is primarily comprised of commissioners and staff from 
each state’s relevant juvenile agency.64 In other circumstances, the 
joint agency could have its own dedicated staff. 
5. Powers. A typical administrative agency has a variety of 
powers. It can gather information, either through investigations or 
by requiring submissions from regulated entities; engage in 
rulemaking; bring enforcement actions; and adjudicate disputes 
 
62 For example, the Delaware River Basin Commission sought to address redundancies 
and conflict that arose from “some 43 state agencies, 14 interstate agencies, and 19 federal 
agencies” that “exercised a multiplicity of splintered powers and duties within the 
watershed.” Clarke D. Rupert, The Delaware River Basin Commission: A Unique 
Partnership, WATER RESOURCES IMPACT, Sept. 2014, at 3, 3, 
https://www.state.nj.us/drbc/library/documents/IMPACT-DRBC-Sept2014.pdf. The 
Commission now has thirty-seven staff positions. See Staff, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMMISSION, 
https://www.state.nj.us/drbc/about/staff/ (last modified Aug. 18, 2020). 
63 For example, the Delaware River Basin Compact’s signatory parties pre-committed to 
support the “current expense budget” of the Commission and to adopt specific budgets that 
would fulfill their promised amount of contribution. Budget, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMMISSION, 
https://www.state.nj.us/drbc/about/budget.html (last modified Sept. 16, 2020). They 
subsequently agreed to a specific percentage apportionment of funds, with the United 
States committing 20% and the member states each contributing amounts that ranged from 
12.5% (Delaware) to 25% (New Jersey and Pennsylvania). Id. 
64 See INTERSTATE COMM’N FOR JUVENILES, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR JUVENILES 2, 
https://www.juvenilecompact.org/sites/default/files/ICJRevisedLanguage.pdf (last revised 
Aug. 27, 2002) [hereinafter JUVENILE COMPACT] (defining “Compact Administrator” as “the 
individual in each compacting state . . . responsible for the administration and management 
of the state’s supervision and transfer of juveniles”); Texas, INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR 
JUVENILES, https://www.juvenilecompact.org/south/texas (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) 
(showing the Commission’s staff as including two probation coordinators from the Texas 
Juvenile Justice Department).  
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brought before it.65 A joint federal-state agency need not have all of 
those powers; its creators might limit its powers to adjudication 
and investigation, for example, or to gathering and sharing 
information. But for purposes of discussion, and to present the 
most constitutionally challenging case, we assume that our joint 
federal-state agency would hold a full suite of traditional agency 
powers. 
Related to questions about agency powers are questions about 
the law an agency creates. Specifically, would its rules and orders 
be considered federal law, state law, or both? For a genuinely joint 
federal-state agency, we assume that the agency’s lawmaking 
would bind both federal and participating-states’ officials as well 
as private entities, and thus would create both federal and state 
law. 
6. Judicial Review. Judicial review is central to administrative 
law: it helps ensure agency fidelity to statutory commands and is 
often cited as a key reason why we willingly accord so much power 
to bureaucracies.66 But judicial review of joint federal-state agency 
decisions presents a potential conundrum.67 The agency’s creators 
must decide whether decisions will be reviewable in state court, 
federal court, or both.68 Our discussion does not assume a specific 
arrangement; instead, that choice would be subject to negotiation 
 
65 See LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN, EDWARD L. RUBIN & KEVIN M. STACK, THE REGULATORY 
STATE 2 (2d ed. 2013) (describing the basic functions of administrative agencies). 
66 See, e.g., David S. Tatel, The Administrative Process and the Rule of Environmental 
Law, 34 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (“We tolerate such sweeping [agency] authority 
only because meaningful judicial review ensures that agency actions are consistent with 
federal law . . . .”). 
67 See Note, supra note 48, at 1996 (arguing that “[i]nterstate compact agencies, by 
definition, frustrate . . . categorical treatment”). 
68 See, e.g., JUVENILE COMPACT, supra note 64, at 13 (designating the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia or “the Federal District Court where the Interstate 
Commission’s principal office is located” as the place to file for judicial review). It is now 
black-letter law that “[t]he construction of a compact sanctioned by Congress under Art. I, § 
10, cl. 3, of the Constitution presents a federal question,” and as a default matter, federal 
courts hold federal question jurisdiction to hear cases involving interpretation of a compact 
agency’s governing statutes. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275, 278 
(1959). But Congress could change that default arrangement and assign initial and 
intermediate review of compact cases to state courts. See Daniel E. Andersen, Note, 
Straddling the Federal-State Divide: Federal Court Review of Interstate Agency Actions, 101 
IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1623 (2016) (“State courts gain jurisdiction when the interstate 
compact’s provisions provide for it.”). 
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among the legislators who create the agency. Regardless of the 
choices those legislators make, both federal and state legislators 
would have to affirmatively consent, in legislation, to judicial 
review in their chosen forums.69 Both the federal government and 
the states possess sovereign immunity—which no other level of 
government can abrogate70—and would likely be indispensable 
parties to any lawsuit involving the agency.71 Consequently, 
without state and federal consent, agency decisions could be 
unreviewable. 
Enacting legislation would therefore need to specify the 
availability of judicial review, the bounds of review, and the proper 
forum for reviewing agency actions. The legislation could be 
modeled on the federal Administrative Procedure Act (the APA)—
or explicitly subject the agency to the APA—and could also 
incorporate state administrative procedures. 
***** 
Joint federal-state governance need not always take one 
particular form, nor have we analyzed every possible detail.72 
Rather, the agency structure explained in this Part provides a 
basic framework for analyzing the key theoretical and 
constitutional questions a joint federal-state agency could raise. 
The next Parts address those questions. 
 
69 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755–60 (1999) (holding that Congress cannot subject 
a state to federal-law-based suits in state courts unless the state consents); Seminole Tribe 
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot subject a state to state-
law-based suits in federal court unless the state consents). 
70 But see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55–56 (stating that Congress may abrogate a 
state’s immunity if Congress has unequivocally expressed its intent to do so and is acting 
pursuant to a valid exercise of power). 
71 See, e.g., Cty. of San Joaquin v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 
284–85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding the dismissal, on indispensable party grounds, of a 
lawsuit challenging a state agency’s regulation of a federal water project).  
72 We have not specified how detailed the substantive statutory commands to the agency 
should be, for example, nor have we explored in detail what standards of review reviewing 
courts should employ. Further, we have not discussed which set(s) of open government laws, 
if any, should apply to the joint agency. We hope that our proposal will spur further 
discussion of the operationalization of federal-state agencies in future work. 
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III. A NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATION FOR JOINT FEDERAL-STATE 
GOVERNANCE 
Part II explained what joint federal-state governance is, and 
this Part explains why it is desirable. The core normative 
justification for this particular brand of federal-state interaction is 
its ability to address stubborn pathologies that dual federalism 
and cooperative federalism have yet to conquer. Oversimplifying 
slightly, those traditional arrangements allocate authority in two 
primary ways: they either (1) divide and separate authority; or (2) 
prescribe overlapping and coordinated authority by assigning 
responsibilities to separate federal and state agencies. This Part 
analyzes each approach, describes their limitations, and explains 
why joint governance offers a promising alternative. We do not 
claim, however, that joint federal-state governance is the fix for all 
federalism challenges, and we offer criteria for determining when 
it would be useful. 
A. DIVIDE AND SEPARATE 
One venerable understanding of federalism emphasizes 
divisions of authority. The Constitution’s framers, for example, 
often stated that the federal government would handle matters of 
national interest while matters of local concern would fall to the 
states. In The Federalist Papers, James Madison argued that “[t]he 
federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; 
the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, 
the local and particular to the State legislatures.”73 Although the 
Constitution’s language does not clearly mandate strict 
separations, provisions like the Tenth Amendment are at least 
consistent with the idea that some governance matters should be 
divided into separate federal and state spheres.74 
The modern rhetoric of “dualist federalism,” which has tended 
to predominate in U.S. Supreme Court decisions, also emphasizes 
 
73 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 69 (James Madison) (Tudor Publishing Co., 1937). 
74 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”). 
308  GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:287 
 
these separations.75 Particularly in Commerce Clause cases, the 
Court often distinguishes between subject matter governed by the 
federal government and subject matter governed by the states.76 
The Court has warned that allowing an overly expansive 
understanding of commerce would “effectually obliterate the 
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a 
completely centralized government.”77 This emphasis on 
separation sometimes leads the Court to try to carve out distinct 
subject matter areas in which the federal government should not 
tread—or at least should not interfere—without Congress first 
offering a clear statement of its intentions.78 Similarly, a key goal 
of the Court’s anti-commandeering decisions has been to preserve 
the states’ ability to operate as separate and distinct political 
entities.79 
While the Court’s decisions tend to get most of the attention, 
legislation plays a more significant role in dividing authority 
between the federal and state governments. Sometimes Congress 
leaves entire fields, like primary and secondary education80 or 
 
75 See Schapiro, supra note 4, at 251, 257–61 (defining dualism as “the view that 
authority for regulating various subjects must be allocated to the national or state 
governments” and describing the Court’s approach as “dualist”).  
76 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (“The Constitution 
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local”).  
77 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–18 (emphasizing the 
need to distinguish between national and local (by which the Court seems to mean state) 
realms of regulation). 
78 See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) 
(noting “the States’ traditional and primary power over land and water use”); Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 617–18 (asserting that some areas are truly local, such as “noneconomic, violent 
criminal conduct”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (noting that Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause “is subject to outer limits”). 
79 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997) (“It is an essential attribute of the 
States’ retained sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous within their 
proper sphere of authority.”); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It was the genius of [the Framers’] idea that our citizens 
would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion 
by the other.”). 
80 See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The High Cost of Education Federalism, 48 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 287, 287 (2013) (“Education federalism in the United States traditionally 
embraces state and local authority over education and a restricted federal role.”). 
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land-use zoning,81 primarily to the states, and sometimes it 
preempts state involvement in broad policy realms.82 In many 
other circumstances, the divisions are more fine-grained. The field 
of energy law, which we will revisit later in this Part, provides 
some particularly striking divisions: federal agencies regulate the 
siting of natural gas pipelines, while states regulate oil pipelines,83 
and federal agencies regulate wholesale pricing of electricity while 
states regulate prices for electricity sold at retail.84 Similar 
federal-state divisions recur in many parts of the U.S. Code.85 
In theory, the reasons for dividing authority are numerous, 
including, among others, ensuring checks and balances. The 
Framers viewed the states as competing with the federal 
government for voters’ affections and serving as guard dogs 
against federal overreach;86 subsequent federalism accounts 
frequently cite the benefits that arise from states checking 
potentially-tyrannical federal authority.87 In theory, dividing state 
 
81 See Dave Owen, Urbanization, Water Quality, and the Regulated Landscape, 82 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 431, 476–77 (2011) (describing Congressional efforts to distinguish between 
environmental regulation, which it perceived as appropriate subject matter for federal 
legislation, and land use planning). 
82 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 403, 407, 410 (2012) (finding 
preemptive federal authority in several subfields of immigration law). 
83 See Klass, supra note 10, at 837, 843 (discussing primary jurisdiction for regulating 
natural gas and oil pipelines). 
84 See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 766–
67 (2016) (observing that under the Federal Power Act, the states have the authority to 
regulate the retail sale of electricity). 
85 See, e.g., Cty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1471 (2020) (describing 
the Clean Water Act’s division between federal authority over some forms of surface water 
pollution and state authority over groundwater pollution and other forms of surface water 
pollution); James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts between 
Models and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 946–
47 (2005) (describing the Clean Air Act’s divisions of authority over mobile-source air 
pollution).  
86 THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, supra note 73, at 111–13 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing 
competing affections); THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, supra note 73, at 174 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(providing what has been described as the guard dogs account, in which vigilant state 
legislators will warn of and guard against federal overreach); Note, Defending Federalism: 
Realizing Publius’s Vision, 122 HARV. L. REV. 745, 746 (2008) (describing the competing 
affections and “guard dogs” accounts).  
87 See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 7, at 39 (“A primary value associated with American 
federalism . . . is its architectural promise of checks and balances.”); Michael W. McConnell, 
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1504 (1987) (noting 
that James Madison acknowledged that the danger of self-interested governance was “best 
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and federal power can also address other values, such as ensuring 
that governance better responds to voter preferences88 or that the 
level of government with the most knowledge of or control over a 
particular policy issue addresses that issue.89 Influential 
conceptual frameworks like the “matching principle” or the 
European Union’s concept of subsidiarity reflect these latter 
expectations. The matching principle would assign governance 
tasks to the smallest government unit whose scale matches the 
geographic scope of the issue being addressed.90 Subsidiarity 
expresses a similar concept: the central government should avoid 
addressing issues that member states or localities can competently 
manage on their own.91 A combined government seems at odds 
with this reasoning, for we routinely assume that one government 
is the better fit in terms of geographic reach, expertise, and voter 
representation. 
B. THE CHALLENGES OF DIVISION 
These principles are intuitively appealing and explain some of 
the reasons why federal and state authority are divided.92 
Nevertheless, for several reasons, they are difficult to put into 
action.  
Most importantly, many governance problems are multi-scalar. 
They have local, regional, national, and sometimes global 
 
tackled at the state level”); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The 
Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 380 (describing tyranny-
prevention as “[p]erhaps the most frequently mentioned function” of federalism).  
88 See MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT COULD HAPPEN 
3–4 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of competition among governments and arguing 
that “centralized, uniform rules” are very difficult to tailor to diverse citizen preferences). 
89 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 576–77 (1985) (Powell, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that local and state officials better understand local conditions). 
90 See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: 
The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 
53 (1996) (“[R]egulatory authority should go to the political jurisdiction that comes closest 
to matching the geographic area affected by a particular externality.”). 
91 See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European 
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 334 (1994) (“[T]he Community 
institutions should refrain from acting . . . if their objectives could effectively be served by 
action taken at or below the Member State level.”). 
92 See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
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dimensions,93 and in practice, they require complex interactions 
among governments at these levels.94 That means choosing a 
single governance level to manage the problem could mean always 
assigning the problem exclusively to the national government, 
which would defeat key purposes of federalism.95 Alternatively, 
one could pretend that national interests do not matter and just 
assign authority to state or local governments without worrying 
about broader consequences. Sometimes laws do this, but often to 
the detriment of broader societal interests.96  
Two additional factors exacerbate this problem. First, the 
boundaries between public policy problems are not crisp, and a 
problem that may seem local when defined in one way can become 
a state or national problem if defined more expansively.97 Consider 
United States v. Morrison, for example: Congress had attempted to 
frame the issue of violence against women as part of a broader, 
and economically-significant, anti-discrimination struggle, which 
aligned the issue with traditional national concerns.98 To the 
Court, however, the prosecution of gendered violence was a classic 
 
93 See, e.g., Adelman & Engel, supra note 18, at 1799 (arguing that the matching principle 
“assumes away much of the inherent complexity of environmental problems”); William W. 
Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 63–74 (1999) (describing the multi-scalar nature of problems 
associated with urban sprawl); Buzbee, Regulatory Commons, supra note 9, at 8–14 
(describing situations in which numerous governments have partial authority over multi-
scalar problems). 
94 These interactions are often “horizontal” (collaboration among different governments at 
one level, such as states working together to address a policy issue), “vertical” (different 
levels of government, such as federal state actors, working together), and even “diagonal” 
(different levels of government working together and collaborating horizontally, such as 
several federal-state or state-local partnerships working together). See Hari M. 
Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama 
Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 241 (2011) (applying the concepts of “horizontal,” 
“vertical,” and “diagonal” interactions to “climate change and clean energy initiatives”).  
95 See supra Section III.A. 
96 See, e.g., Dave Owen, Mapping, Modeling, and the Fragmentation of Environmental 
Law, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 219, 237 (describing the consequences of allowing local 
governments to engage in large-lot zoning). 
97 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 
DUKE L.J. 795, 810 (2005) (noting the tendency for “spillover effects” among environmental 
issues); Waxman, supra note 8, 314–18 (describing the interjurisdictional complexities of 
national security law). 
98 See 529 U.S. 598, 628–34 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (summarizing Congress’s 
findings). 
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instance of state criminal law enforcement.99 Second, policy 
problems, and the scales at which they arise, also tend to change 
over time. For instance, consider the COVID-19 pandemic, in 
which localized outbreaks quickly became national, and national 
outbreaks spiraled into a global catastrophe.100 
Even if assigning a particular geographic scale to each public 
policy problem were possible, an additional difficulty arises: often, 
finding a preexisting governance entity that matches that scale 
may be impossible. In theory, we might adopt a new governance 
structure for every problem, but that could quickly become 
unwieldy.101 The alternative is to assign problems to preexisting 
governance units. But policy problems routinely spill across state 
and local boundaries even if the problems remain subnational in 
scale.102 Consequently, so long as we are committed to general-
purpose subnational governance units with stable boundaries—
such as cities, counties, and states—we must accept that those 
units’ boundaries are poor fits for some problems. 
Finally, concepts like dual federalism or the matching principle 
hold uneven traction with the voters and politicians who actually 
make decisions about allocating authority. State or local 
governments frequently tackle seemingly global problems—
climate change is a prominent example103—and the national 
government, with strong popular support, asserts authority in 
 
99 Id. at 618 (majority opinion) (“[W]e can think of no better example of the police power, 
which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the 
suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”). 
100 See Timeline: WHO’s COVID-19 Response, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/interactive-
timeline/#event-0 (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) (tracing the rise of COVID-19 from a small, 
localized virus to a global pandemic). 
101 See Freeman & Farber, supra note 97, at 804 (noting the risk of creating “bloated 
administrative agencies”). 
102 See, e.g., Buzbee, Regulatory Commons, supra note 9, at 8–14 (providing examples of 
localized activities with effects that cross local, state, and even national boundaries).  
103 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 18, at 1098–99 (detailing the policy initiatives of state 
and local governments in response to climate change, despite the federal government’s 
inactivity in this area); Who’s In, WE ARE STILL IN, https://www.wearestillin.com/signatories 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2020) (showing states, local governments, and businesses that have 
committed to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement—a climate treaty from which President 
Trump withdrew).  
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spheres once associated with state or local governance.104 That 
means divide-and-separate concepts, though appealing when 
described in academic studies or judicial rhetoric, appear to 
explain little about the preferences of the people who actually 
make most decisions about allocating authority. 
C. OVERLAP AND COORDINATE 
Partially because of the problems of the divide-and-separate 
approach to federalism, American governance is filled with subject 
areas in which federal, state, and local authority play important 
roles. Indeed, these zones of overlap are so pervasive that some 
commentators have dismissed the quest for exclusive authority as 
a passé sideshow.105 American governance institutions have 
developed an array of systems for working in zones of overlapping 
authority, and academic theories provide both descriptive accounts 
of, and normative justifications for, these zones of overlap.106 
The sheer variety of systems for working on shared issues 
across federal-state boundaries defies any attempt at a concise 
summary, but even a partial listing should convey the richness of 
the field. Some of the more complex regimes use cooperative 
systems of administrative integration, in which the federal 
government creates a binding regulatory scheme but allows states 
to lead the implementation of all or part of that scheme, subject to 
continuing federal administrative oversight.107 In fields ranging 
 
104 See, e.g., Engel, supra note 18, at 167 (“The federal government is legendary for 
poaching on state and local governments’ territory by addressing issues that some may 
argue are purely local.”); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Quality as a National Good in 
a Federal State, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 199, 210 (noting that voters tend to perceive 
environmental issues as national). 
105 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695, 1703 (2017) 
(“Anyone positing state autonomy as federalism’s end goal is pursuing a conception of state 
power that is quickly becoming beside the point in our highly integrated regime.”). 
106 See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 6, at 1589 (arguing that floor preemption, in which the 
federal government sets a minimum standard above which states may regulate, “embraces 
multilayered institutional arrangements and sets in motion virtually constant federal, 
state, and private stakeholder interactions”); Freeman & Farber, supra note 97, at 911 
(analyzing the benefits and challenges of involving multiple agencies and multiple levels of 
governments in addressing environmental problems).  
107 See Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse 
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 740–41 (2006) 
(describing cooperative federalism as including both primary federal control with state 
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from environmental108 to health109 to telecommunications110 law, 
versions of these systems have assumed central importance. 
Sometimes as part of these administrative oversight systems, and 
sometimes outside of them, the federal government often uses its 
spending power to facilitate coordinated policy in zones of 
overlapping interest.111 When the federal government grants 
money to states but attaches strings, it can ensure some fealty to 
national goals while still allowing states discretion to tailor 
programs to more localized interests.112 
Other programs navigate overlapping interests by creating 
obligations for federal regulators (or federally-regulated actors) to 
consult with, or even seek the approval of, state agencies.113 Some 
of these provisions give states effective vetoes over federal 
decisions.114 Other provisions create generalized public 
participation rights that allow states—like any other interested 
party—to comment on proposed federal decisions, or that require a 
 
implementation and systems that involve federal-state partnerships); Dave Owen, 
Cooperative Subfederalism, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 177, 179 (2018) (describing the basic 
structures of cooperative federalism programs).  
108 See Glicksman, supra note 107, at 727–54 (describing the importance and evolution of 
environmental cooperative federalism programs). 
109 See Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 19, at 584 (describing Medicaid and 
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program as “paradigmatic ‘cooperative federalism’ 
programs”). 
110 See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative 
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665–66 (2001) (describing telecommunications regulations 
as an example of cooperative federalism). 
111 Cf. Erin Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law after Sebelius, 85 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1003, 1012 (2014) (“[T]he spending power enables Congress to bargain with 
states for access to policymaking arenas that are beyond the reach of its other enumerated 
powers.”). 
112 Id. at 1010–12 (describing how Congress uses the spending power to entice states to 
join regulatory partnerships). 
113 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 823a(c) (2018) (requiring the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) to consult with states when granting exemptions from hydropower 
licensing requirements and to include state-recommended conditions in the exemptions); id. 
§ 1456(c)(1)(C) (requiring federal agencies carrying out activities in coastal areas to certify 
that their activity is consistent with state coastal zone management policies). 
114 See Carlson, supra note 18, at 1100 (describing a system of federalism in which “one 
level of government—either the singled-out state actor or the national government—moves 
to regulate a particular environmental policy area” which “then triggers a series of 
iterations adopted in turn by the higher or lower level of government”).  
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federal agency to consult with the states before deciding.115 Still 
others allow federal agencies similar opportunities to comment on 
states’ decisions.116 And both state and federal governments 
regularly litigate when they believe their interests have received 
insufficient respect.117 
In addition to these formal mechanisms, states can use politics 
and informal communications to influence federal decisions, and 
federal agencies can do the same with the states. State officials 
(sometimes working through their state’s representatives in 
Congress) routinely use political means to try to influence federal 
agency decisions.118 State and federal agency staff also regularly 
communicate with each other.119 Sometimes those communications 
involve negotiating authority and policy in zones where authority 
overlaps and where federal-state dividing lines are blurry.120 Or 
governments may share expertise and support, either openly or 
through more clandestine “secret boyfriend” arrangements.121 
While they receive little public attention and only modest 
academic interest, these informal federal-state contacts are 
 
115 The classic and most important example is the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2018) 
(requiring an opportunity to comment on proposed rules). For consultation, see, for 
example, 15 U.S.C. § 717b-1(b) to -1(c) (2018) (requiring FERC to consult with the state 
governor regarding potential state and local safety issues associated with a proposed 
liquefied natural gas terminal, and requiring FERC to “review and respond specifically” to 
concerns raised).  
116 See, e.g., Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the 
Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099, 1118 (2012) (describing federal agency 
comments on state water-allocation decisions).  
117 See Lin, supra note 21, at 634–46 (describing some of the many recent lawsuits states 
have filed against the executive branch). 
118 See Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. 
REV. 953, 955–56 (2014) (describing “how state involvement in federal regulation has been 
operationalized through a largely overlooked universe of ‘state interest groups’ . . . that 
lobby federal agencies and consult on pending federal rules and policies, advancing the 
‘state’ view” (footnote omitted)). 
119 See Dave Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58, 107, 114–15 
(2016) (describing the frequency of federal-state communications and noting that the 
geographic distribution of federal offices can facilitate that communication). 
120 See Ryan, supra note 18, at 5 (“Working directly or indirectly with counterparts across 
state-federal lines, regulators reach consensus about sharing or dividing contested 
authority . . . in order to move forward with needed governance.”). 
121 Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, 70 STAN. L. 
REV. 1689, 1767–72 (2018) (describing creative models for Affordable Care Act 
administration). 
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routine, and they provide important mechanisms of coordination in 
zones of shared interest and authority.122 
Particularly in recent years, academics have expended great 
effort in developing theories that integrate the reality of extensive 
federal-state overlap with the Constitution’s emphasis upon 
treating these two governments as powerful and distinct entities. 
The emerging theories come with a wide variety of labels, and for 
purposes of simplicity, we will lump the most prominent groups of 
ideas into two general (and overlapping) camps. One set of theories 
generally falls under the label of “interactive” or “dynamic” 
federalism,123 and the other, more recent school describes itself as 
“nationalist federalism.”124 Both schools of thought agree that 
dualist federalist theory describes nostalgic ideals, not the 
complex, overlapping realities of contemporary American 
governance.125 But neither school is willing to write off states, as 
dual federalism’s earlier generations of critics might have done.126 
 
122 See Owen, supra note 119, at 114–15 (describing how regional field offices allow 
federal and state regulators to communicate effectively and “provide geographically limited 
spaces within which states and local governments can tailor federal policy to their liking”). 
123 See Blake Hudson, Dynamic Forest Federalism, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1643, 1651–
52 (2014) (defining “dynamic federalism”); Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, 
Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773, 809–13 (2013) (summarizing the 
literature); Schapiro, supra note 4, at 285 (“[T]he key elements of polyphonic federalism are 
the protection of the institutional integrity of multiple sources of power and the promotion 
of the dynamic interaction of those centers of authority.”). Other articles in this vein have 
used different terms to describe similar phenomena. See, e.g., Adelman & Engel, supra note 
18, at 1827 (describing “adaptive federalism”); Carlson, supra note 18, at 1099 (describing 
“iterative federalism” as “repeated, sustained, and dynamic lawmaking efforts involving 
both levels of government”); Osofsky, supra note 94, at 238 (developing a “diagonal 
federalism” theory). 
124 See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 19, at 1890 (describing a “nationalist school of 
federalism”); Gluck, supra note 19, at 1998 (describing “National Federalism”). 
125 See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 105, at 1698 (“A moment’s thought should make clear 
that [separate zones of federal and state sovereignty are not] how the world looks any more. 
And yet the picture I’ve just described continues to animate much of constitutional doctrine 
and theory.”).  
126 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 22 (1990) (describing New Deal reformers’ view that “[s]tates were 
weak and ineffectual, unable to deal with serious social problems . . . [and] hardly seemed to 
be a forum for democratic self-determination”); see also Joel Rogers, Foreword: Federalism 
Bound, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 282 (2016) (describing concerns about “[b]ad 
federalism” which “denotes oppressive local elites running riot, or joining with national 
elites, to resist or undermine civil rights, environmental protection, business standards, or 
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Instead, dynamic federalists and nationalist federalists tend to 
celebrate federal-state overlap, albeit for slightly different reasons. 
For the interactive federalists, overlap is desirable primarily 
because it will lead to better governmental responses to societal 
problems.127 That will happen, theorists explain, partly because 
overlap creates some redundancy, which means that one level of 
government can respond to a problem when other levels fail to 
act.128 Additionally, scholars in the interactive federalism camp 
emphasize that overlap facilitates iterative processes of policy 
diffusion.129 If both federal and state (and local) governments 
regulate in the same realms, they will be more likely to learn from 
and build upon each other’s initiatives, and successful policies are 
more likely to traverse the various levels of government, often 
evolving as they do so.130 Overlap, in short, should mean more 
robust, effective governance.131 
The nationalist federalists do not disagree with these ideas, but 
their emphasis is different. Their central priority is maintaining 
functional politics in a nation marked by profound policy 
disagreements.132 Traditional dual federalists believe that the 
answer to this dilemma is to carve out discrete policy realms in 
which states alone could act.133 Their solution, in other words, is to 
provide states with opportunities to exit from national policy 
 
the public goods and social wage other rich countries consider ingredients of a decent 
society”). 
127 See, e.g., Adelman & Engel, supra note 18, at 1832 (“[R]etention of both federal and 
state jurisdiction reinforces processes that contribute to better regulatory outcomes, 
particularly opportunities for positive feedback and incentives for a higher level of 
coordination between the state and federal levels of government.”). 
128 See Engel, supra note 18, at 178–81 (describing overlapping jurisdictions as a 
“regulatory safety net”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit 
Federal Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 69, 74 (2005) (“The genius in having multiple levels of 
government is that if one fails to act, another can step in to solve the problem.”). 
129 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 18, at 1098–1100 (describing the development of federal 
and state climate policy as an example of iterative federalism). 
130 See Engel, supra note 18, at 183 (discussing “vertical policy dissemination” as “the 
most efficient method of spreading innovation”). 
131 See id. at 161 (criticizing “static allocation of authority” which “deprives citizens of the 
benefits of overlapping jurisdiction”); see also Buzbee, supra note 6, at 1599–1612 (arguing 
against preemption regimes that limit concurrent authority). 
132 See supra note 19. 
133 See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 19, at 1261 (describing the traditional dual 
federalists’ views). 
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schemes, and thus provide consolation prizes when their 
preferences lose on the national stage. The nationalist federalists 
agree that states are crucially important, but they have largely 
rejected this emphasis on exit.134 More important, they argue, is a 
federalism of voice, in which state preferences can be expressed, 
and conflicts with federal policy can be managed, within zones of 
overlapping authority.135 Overlap, then, is not only—or even 
primarily—a means for ensuring more robust governance. Instead, 
it is a framework for managing difficult political conflicts. 
D. THE CHALLENGES OF OVERLAP 
Overlap-and-coordinate approaches are unquestionably central 
to American federalism, and the theoretical accounts described 
above help explain their necessity and value. Nevertheless, these 
approaches can create significant practical problems, and the 
theoretical responses to these problems remain somewhat thin. 
The problems grow from a simple origin: overlapping authority 
means multiple decision-makers. And while multiple decision-
makers can, and often will, discuss matters and harmonize the 
processes and substance of their decisionmaking, they will not 
always make those attempts, and sometimes attempted 
collaborations will not be fruitful.136 One consequence of that failed 
coordination can be uncertainty about who has authority to issue a 
decision.137 A second consequence can be parallel regulatory 
processes, which can lead to sequencing challenges, delay, and 
 
134 See Heather K. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349, 1356 (2013) 
(“Administrative units are, almost by definition, not sites for exit. They are part of the 
system, not outside of it.”). 
135 Cf. id. at 1385–86 (“[W]e have spent relatively little time on the possibility that 
minorities might make policy rather than complain about it, that they might wield power 
within the system rather than outside of it, that they might serve as connected critics 
rather than autonomous outsiders.”); see Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 19, at 1259 
(“[U]ncooperative federalism values a state’s voice options over its exit options.”). 
136 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 5, at 1181–96 (describing challenges of coordination 
and mechanisms to overcome those challenges). 
137 See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind & Ryan Cook, The Cost of Contentiousness: A Status 
Report on Offshore Wind in the Eastern United States, 33 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 204, 233 (2015) 
(noting “considerable confusion,” which an interagency memorandum later partially 
resolved, about whether the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management or the FERC held 
authority to permit offshore wind energy facilities). 
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potentially conflicting decisions.138 Additionally, overlapping 
authority rarely means equal authority, and one government’s 
decision may trump another’s, effectively subordinating interests 
that the other government was supposed to advance or protect.139 
Alternatively, the presence of multiple decision-makers can lead to 
an abdication of authority.140 If everyone is responsible, then, 
effectively, no one is responsible, for every potentially-accountable 
person can point the proverbial finger at someone else.141 
These potential problems will be obvious to anyone who has 
attempted to make a group decision. The key point reduces to the 
simple cliché that too many cooks will spoil a meal. Nevertheless, 
the theoretical accounts of federalism that extol the virtues of 
governmental overlap often gloss over these problems.142 They 
emphasize the positive outcomes that can arise from overlap, and 
they provide some sampling of the rich variety of ways in which 
those outcomes emerge. That focus makes some sense; if the goal 
is to respond to dual federalism’s emphasis on separation, then 
describing the potential virtues of overlapping governance is a 
good place to start.143 But that point has been thoroughly made. 
 
138 See, e.g., id. at 216–22 (describing the struggles of the Cape Wind project, which was 
proposed for Nantucket Sound in Massachusetts). 
139 This is a common complaint about federal authority, but it also can arise where federal 
law hands the trump card to a state. See, e.g., PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Wash. Dep’t. of 
Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 732–34 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing the Court’s prior 
warning that granting states “‘veto power’ over federal hydroelectric projects” would 
improperly limit federal authority (quoting First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power 
Comm’n, 328 U.S. 152, 164 (1946))). 
140 See generally Buzbee, Regulatory Commons, supra note 9, at 22–37 (describing 
regulatory gaps that emerge when numerous governing authorities partially control a 
regulatory area); Wiseman, supra note 9, at 242–52 (exploring principal-agent challenges in 
cooperative federalism).  
141 Buzbee, Regulatory Commons, supra note 9, at 63 (“Where a social ill is juxtaposed 
against multiple potential regulators, all will be tempted to ignore that social ill and free 
ride on the anticipated actions of others.”). 
142 But see Freeman & Rossi, supra note 5, at 1145–50 (noting, in the context of 
overlapping jurisdiction among federal agencies, the possibilities of pursuit of “conflicting or 
incompatible policies,” vetoes of one agency’s action by another, regulatory gaps, and other 
collective action challenges).  
143 An additional lesson from this literature is that government actors will sometimes 
forge successful federal-state collaborations where formal governance structures do not 
support those collaborations or are seemingly designed to inhibit them. See Gluck & 
Huberfeld, supra note 121, 1767 (describing a variety of creative forms of healthcare 
federalism, some without support from state elected officials). 
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The logical next step is to consider how to manage overlapping 
governance so that these virtues might be more consistently 
achieved. Some of that work will focus on existing governance 
arrangements, which, despite their flaws, have many positive 
features to recommend them. But some of it may also focus on the 
possibility of new governance institutions, or on arrangements 
that have been lurking, largely unnoticed, on the fringes of 
federalism practice and theory. 
E. THE ADVANTAGES OF JOINT GOVERNANCE 
A joint federal-state governance structure may provide a better 
way of avoiding, or at least limiting, many problems posed by dual 
and cooperative federalism. To some extent, the benefits of a joint 
structure invert the disadvantages of separate and overlapping 
systems. Where divided federalism creates awkward divisions of 
authority, often giving overlapping responsibility to different 
levels of government for the same underlying problem,144 a joint 
structure would allow teamwork. Where both dual and cooperative 
federalism may create the need for serial and potentially 
conflicting federal and state decisionmaking, a joint agency would 
allow one-stop shopping, providing the efficiency and clarity of a 
single, coordinated decisionmaking process. Finally, while 
dispersing authority among federal and state agencies can create 
confusion about who is responsible, sometimes leading to the 
abdication of responsibility,145 a joint structure leaves no such 
doubt. The ultimate result should be more efficient governance. 
A joint agency also could better balance federal and state 
interests. In part, it could provide an effective forum for resolving 
clashes between federal and state interests and between the 
interests of different states. Instead of leaving state and federal 
 
144 For example, the Clean Air Act preempts state regulation of mobile sources while also 
requiring each state to develop an effective regulatory plan for regional air pollutants, 
which come primarily from the same mobile sources that the state is preempted from 
regulating. See Fine & Owen, supra note 85, at 946–47.  
145 See Buzbee, Regulatory Commons, supra note 9, at 6–8 (discussing regulatory gaps 
that emerge from shared partial authority), Justin Weinstein-Tull, Abdication and 
Federalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 841 (2017) (describing states’ delegation of 
responsibility to local governments and blame shifting for any inaction to local 
governments); Wiseman, supra note 9, at 247 (discussing principal-agent issues of 
cooperative federalism). 
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agencies to arrive at separate positions and then to use political 
processes, litigation, or preemption trump cards to sort out the 
disagreement, a joint agency would provide places and processes 
where those disagreements must be resolved. That does not mean 
eliminating conflict, of course; disagreements that once happened 
between federal and state agencies would instead arise within the 
agency. Nevertheless, bringing opposing interests together within 
the same building, rather than leaving them to shout across 
fences, could lead to substantively better results; repeat 
interaction and the need to reach a decision could produce more 
creative outcomes.146 Those benefits are particularly likely where 
the agency combines federal and state staff as well as final 
decisionmakers.147 Even within existing structures, federal and 
state agency staff can collaborate, but successful working 
relationships can be easier to forge when the workers commute to 
the same office and serve on the same team.148 
Beyond reaching better and more efficient outcomes in 
individual matters, a joint structure could facilitate better ongoing 
relationships between federal and state governments. These 
relationships are, in theory, one of the primary benefits of the 
overlap-and-coordinate systems of federalism.149 Academic 
accounts of these systems often discuss how overlap can facilitate 
better learning about policy challenges and sharing of effective 
responses or can provide more constructive arenas to hash out 
conflict.150 But overlap-and-coordinate approaches do not 
guarantee these benefits. Instead, they will materialize only if 
agencies pay close attention to what other agencies are doing, 
which will not always happen if leaders and staff work in separate 
offices and for separate levels of government.151 Policy learning, in 
 
146 See Owen, supra note 107, at 217–23 (describing the benefits of blurred boundaries 
and ongoing interaction for state-local governance). 
147 Cf. id. at 219 (noting the successes that local governments have had when both local 
and state staff communicate consistently). 
148 See Owen, supra note 119, at 86–87 (describing arrangements where federal agency 
staff work out of state agency offices). 
149 See supra notes 118–122 & 129–130 and accompanying text. 
150 See supra notes 127–130 and accompanying text (describing and citing accounts of 
interactive federalism). 
151 For a discussion of the general challenges of state and local officials figuring out how 
regulation works in other state and local jurisdictions and how to share information, see 
Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulatory Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1694–1723 (2014). 
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other words, is not an organic process; it typically requires strong 
interest and repeat contact, which are easier to achieve when 
people work together.152  
Of course, a joint agency structure would also present 
disadvantages. Political clashes between opposing state and 
federal interests, as contrasted with heated dialogues among 
members of a joint commission, might generate a broader array of 
creative and potentially effective solutions to a problem—although 
likely with far higher transaction costs and, perhaps, direct harms 
for the duration of the clash. Forming a joint agency would likely 
require political will and legislative effort, which may not be 
forthcoming. A joint agency also would not create a consolidated 
forum for resolving every potential issue that might arise, for 
many policy challenges do not map neatly onto the jurisdictions of 
single agencies, and the need to work with other federal and state 
agencies would sometimes remain.153 Questions would inevitably 
arise about the boundaries of the agency’s responsibility and 
authority, and about how its powers interact with other state and 
federal legislative schemes.  
Some disadvantages are more subtle. Perhaps most 
importantly, collaboration between agencies and legislatures 
would be more challenging with two legislative masters to serve. 
Agencies are often involved in constructive dialogue with 
legislatures; agency staff may review and even suggest new 
legislative initiatives, some of which are enacted, all with the goal 
of creating more effective regulatory regimes.154 That kind of 
exchange would become more difficult if two legislatures—both 
state and federal—need to act, particularly when one is the often-
gridlocked U.S. Congress.155 The resulting challenges could ossify 
 
152 Id. at 1713–22 (describing how a lack of resources and incentives impede information 
production and sharing between state agencies). 
153 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 5, at 1136 (observing that “overlapping and 
fragmented delegations . . . are inevitable, pervasive, and stubborn”). 
154 See CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER, FEDERAL AGENCIES IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN STATUTORY DRAFTING 1–2 (2015), https://www.acus.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/technical-assistance-final-report.pdf (noting that “federal agencies 
are involved regularly and extensively in the legislative process”). 
155 Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
88–93 (2014) (describing and citing to data on congressional polarization and the 
dysfunction that results). 
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the legislative structures within which joint federal-state agencies 
operate. 
These are likely to be significant challenges, and, in some 
circumstances, they provide reasons why a joint agency would not 
make sense (or at least be unlikely to emerge). But no governance 
structure is a panacea, and the key policy question about joint 
federal agencies instead should be whether they can offer 
promising alternatives to existing arrangements in some 
circumstances. Because of their potential benefits for efficiency, 
finality, and coordination, we believe that they sometimes will. 
F. THE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR JOINT GOVERNANCE 
While the primary argument of this Part has been that joint 
federal-state agencies offer promising alternatives to traditional 
arrangements, we do not claim that they will always be preferable. 
This Section, therefore, establishes general criteria for evaluating 
when a joint federal-state agency will make sense, and it 
illustrates the potential value of a joint agency under these 
circumstances through examples drawn from the fields of energy 
and water management.  
Joint federal-state agencies will likely be most effective when 
several factors converge: 
(1) the federal government and states both possess 
important interests in, and authority over, the 
subject matter the agency would address; 
(2) both levels of government bring important practical 
advantages to governance, such as knowledge of 
the governed issue; 
(3) states share a policy challenge that they will 
struggle to resolve independently; and 
(4) the agency can address the challenge without 
opening a Pandora’s box of regulatory tasks in 
divergent jurisdictional areas. 
All of these factors need not be present for joint federal-state 
governance to be preferable to dual or cooperative governance. For 
example, a single state facing a substantial policy issue could 
formally team up with federal officials. But the more of these 
factors present, the more likely it is that joint federal-state 
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governance will be appropriate. The two short examples below, 
which we draw from water and energy law, illustrate how this 
framework would apply. 
1. Siting Transmission Lines for Electricity Generation. A 
particularly promising opportunity for joint federal-state 
governance comes from energy law. Among other energy 
regulation challenges,156 joint agencies could help address difficult 
questions about the siting of new energy transmission lines. 
Both federal and state governments have strong interests and 
traditional authority in this realm. The Federal Power Act gives 
the federal government control over the interstate transmission 
and sale of wholesale electricity.157 That is a reasonable allocation 
of control: electricity transmission is a classic example of interstate 
commerce and has crucial implications for the national economy 
and the globally significant issue of climate change.158 But even 
though FERC regulates the actual transmission of electricity in 
interstate commerce, it cannot regulate the location of 
transmission lines, which are necessary to transport electricity 
from generators to utilities.159 Rather, states exclusively exercise 
this authority and have regularly blocked important interstate 
transmission projects.160 That may frustrate national goals and the 
interests of other states, but compelling reasons exist for this state 
authority. Transmission lines are visually and environmentally 
 
156 We also think a joint agency would be a good way to address electricity pricing, which 
is awkwardly divided between federal regulation of wholesale pricing and state regulation 
of retail pricing. See supra note 84. But that subject is outside the scope of this Article. 
157 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2018) (providing FERC with “jurisdiction over all facilities 
for [the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce]”); Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 767 (2016) (noting that the Federal 
Power Act gives FERC the authority to regulate the transmission and sale of electric energy 
in interstate commerce). 
158 See Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause Review 
for Interstate Coordination, 100 MINN. L. REV. 129, 143–44 (2015) (describing the 
importance of transmission infrastructure to renewable energy development). 
159 See Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 
39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1033–36 (2009) (noting a recent congressional attempt to give the 
federal government some authority over transmission line siting and the courts’ narrow 
construction of the federal statute). 
160 See Klass & Rossi, supra note 158, at 153–54, 190–94 (noting how state laws often 
block interstate transmission projects).  
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intrusive, and states clearly have interests in the siting of major 
land uses within their territories.161 
The federal government and states both also have important 
governance advantages in transmission line siting. Decisions 
about the location of energy infrastructure—including electric 
generation plants and transmission and distribution lines—are in 
some respects rightfully left to the states because of states’ historic 
control over land use decisions and expertise in this area.162 And 
the federal government, which since the 1930s has regulated 
wholesale electricity, has amassed a great deal of technical 
knowledge about the process of interstate electricity transmission 
and about interconnecting generators with that transmission.163 
Furthermore, the federal government provides an important birds-
eye perspective on interstate electricity transactions.164  
Electricity transmission also presents a common policy 
challenge shared among the states—a challenge that states 
increasingly struggle to resolve on their own. When electricity first 
emerged as a consumer service, it was distinctly local; numerous 
power plants served customers within one city and did not 
transport energy over long distances.165 But over time, generation 
became increasingly centralized, and power plants began sending 
electricity over large transmission lines to distant populations.166 
 
161 See Anne M. Trainor, Robert I. McDonald & Joseph Fargione, Energy Sprawl Is the 
Largest Driver of Land Use Change in United States, PLOS ONE (Sept. 8, 2016), 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0162269 (evaluating the potential land-based impacts 
that unconventional energy sources will have on the states). 
162 See, e.g., Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use 
Regulation, and the States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 236 (2008) (“For centuries now, land use 
regulation, administration, and enforcement has centered around localities.”). 
163 See, e.g., Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and 
Operating Public Utilities, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, at 17–23 (July 21, 2011), 
https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/Order-1000.pdf (describing the Commission’s 
many orders relating to the electricity transmission and the Commission’s convening of 
technical conferences on transmission planning).  
164 See ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40657, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE 
IN ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION FACILITY SITING 1 (2010), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40657.pdf (discussing calls for an increased federal role in 
transmission siting because of “concerns over grid congestion and . . . reliability”). 
165 See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole, The “Regulatory Contract,” in THE END OF A NATURAL 
MONOPOLY 43, 73 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003) (describing more than 
forty-five franchises that provided electricity to Chicago residents in 1907).  
166 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, UNITED STATES ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY PRIMER 4 (2015), 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/12/f28/united-states-electricity-industry-
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The modern transmission grid is interstate and even international; 
much of the grid in the Northeast and Midwest extends into 
Canada.167 Adding to that grid unavoidably requires interstate 
coordination; a transmission line cannot convey wind energy from 
Texas to Georgia, for example, without crossing the states in 
between. But the individual states have limited power to resolve 
these coordination challenges on their own—and sometimes have 
strong incentives against doing so.168 For example, if Alabama and 
Tennessee refuse to site the line, Texas and Georgia are stuck. 
Finally, although the actual practice of electricity transmission 
is complex—and is already governed by regional private entities 
overseen by FERC—the location of new transmission lines is a 
relatively discrete issue.169 Although it is politically contentious, 
the issue boils down to finding a location for the line that will 
support new generation and storage, minimally impact individuals 
who live and operate businesses along the line’s proposed route, 
and connect generation to the areas with the highest electricity 
demand.170 Due to all these factors, state and federal members 
within a joint federal-state agency might better overcome the 
existing obstacles to transmission line siting. 
2. Interstate Water Quantity and Quality. Interstate water 
commissions provide a rare, yet living and breathing, example of 
joint federal-state governance in action. But in contrast to 
electricity siting, they also provide cautionary stories about 
circumstances when joint governance will face significant 
challenges. 
 
primer.pdf (describing the transition from short-distance direct-current transmission of 
electricity to long-distance alternating-current transmission).  
167 Id. at 11 (showing the Eastern Interconnection, which covers much of the Midwest, 
and its extension into Canada). 
168 See Klass & Rossi, supra note 158, at 151 (noting that “each state may not value the 
benefits of siting the transmission line in the same manner” and that “incentives 
surrounding the private interest group dynamic can also present the possibility for a state 
or local government actor to hold out”). 
169 See Hannah J. Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky, Regional Energy Governance and U.S. 
Carbon Emissions, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143, 184–88 (2016) (describing balancing authorities 
and regional transmission organizations).  
170 Cf. VANN, supra note 164, at 1 (“State and local governments are well positioned to 
weigh the local factors that go into siting decisions, including environmental and scenery 
concerns, zoning issues, development plans, and safety concerns.”). 
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These commissions govern the quantity of water withdrawals 
from interstate rivers and their tributaries; some also regulate the 
quality of that water.171 There are good reasons for joint 
governance to have emerged in this area. The federal government 
and states possess strong authority over waterways. Under the 
equal footing doctrine, states have title to lands beneath waters 
that were navigable when the states achieved statehood.172 States 
also traditionally exercised primary control over water 
withdrawals from surface waterways and groundwater aquifers.173 
Meanwhile, the federal government, under the Commerce Clause, 
has clear authority to regulate navigable waters.174 Both states 
and federal entities have long histories of exercising these powers, 
sometimes causing confusion and conflict. As the Delaware River 
Basin Compact of 1961 notes: 
[T]he water resources of the basin are presently 
subject to the duplicating, overlapping, and 
uncoordinated administration of some forty-three 
State agencies, fourteen interstate agencies, and 
nineteen Federal agencies which exercise a 
multiplicity of powers and duties resulting in a 
splintering of authority and responsibilities.175  
Our second factor—expertise—presents a more complicated 
story. When Congress and the states created joint agencies to 
 
171 See, e.g., SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMM’N, SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMPACT 3 
(1972), https://www.srbc.net/about/about-us/docs/srbc-compact.pdf (defining “[b]asin” as “the 
area of drainage of the Susquehanna River and its tributaries into Chesapeake Bay” to a 
defined point); id. at 10 (providing that Commission approval shall be required for “[a]ny 
project involving the diversion of water”); id. at 13 (allowing the Commission to set water 
quality standards for the basin).  
172 See Robert W. Adler, The Ancient Mariner of Constitutional Law: The Historical, Yet 
Declining Role of Navigability, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1643, 1658 (2013) (describing the equal 
footing doctrine).  
173 See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653, 678 (1978) (noting “the consistent 
thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress” and “the need 
to observe state water law”).  
174 See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985) 
(describing Congress’s use of Commerce Clause authority to support water quality 
regulation); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 509–10 (1945) (holding 
that federal power to promote navigation trumps state water rights). 
175 Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688, 688 (1961). 
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manage river basins, both federal and state governments had 
expertise in some areas of river management. For example, in 
addition to its expertise in maintaining navigability, the federal 
government had long-running (albeit controversial) experience in 
building and operating dams.176 States, meanwhile, held 
traditional authority over water quality management177 and 
recreational fisheries.178 But by any objective measure, the states 
had been abysmal water quality protectors; responsibility had not 
yet translated into demonstrated expertise or effectiveness.179 And 
much of the water-management expertise the federal government 
has since developed—for example, in fields like water quality and 
endangered species protection—had yet to emerge.180 Today, both 
federal and state water-management expertise is well ahead of 
what it was in the 1960s.181 But when the joint agencies first 
emerged and defined their roles, crucial gaps in both federal and 
state expertise existed.182 
The third factor (a shared policy challenge) is present in the 
interstate river context, but the fourth factor (manageably discrete 
tasks) poses difficulties. Joint federal-state governance will 
operate most effectively when a joint agency can address a 
 
176 See, e.g., Christine A. Klein, On Dams and Democracy, 78 OR. L. REV. 641, 641–42 
(1999) (describing the federally led dam-building effort in the twentieth century). 
177 See William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United 
States—State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part I, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 178–
80 (2003) (describing state primacy in water quality regulation in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries). 
178 See Eric Biber & Josh Eagle, When Does Legal Flexibility Work in Environmental 
Law?, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 787, 808–09 (2015) (noting traditional state primacy in hunting 
law, a category in which the authors include fishing regulation). 
179 See Andreen, supra note 177, at 178–88 (describing states’ struggles to develop water 
quality standards, collaborate with other states, and address the impacts of industrial 
pollution). 
180 In both fields, a major federal role emerged in the early 1970s, when Congress passed 
major water quality and endangered species legislation. See Endangered Species Act of 
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44); Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388). 
181 See, e.g., Dave Owen, Little Streams and Legal Transformations, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 1, 
15–30 (describing the evolution of regulators’ understanding of, and approaches to, stream 
protection). 
182 See, e.g., Andreen, supra note 177, at 183–84, 191–94 (explaining the challenges of 
implementing water quality standards). 
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manageable and discrete set of policy issues.183 In the context of 
shared rivers, there is one discrete resource at issue: the river. But 
the factors that impact rivers, including the amount of water that 
flows to and through the river and the amount and types of 
pollution that reach the river, are geographically distributed and 
incredibly varied.184 This gives the federal-state commissions 
charged with governing these discrete resources a herculean task, 
often pulling the commissions into politically charged territory as 
they stray into diverse policy areas.185 Here, again, historical 
contingencies exacerbated the challenges of a sweeping mission. 
Shortly after the Delaware and Susquehanna River Basin 
Commissions were created,186 Congress enacted a series of statutes 
that transformed environmental law, inserting much stronger 
federal governance into realms where the commissions (which 
federal agencies had never enthusiastically supported) were 
supposed to act.187 Consequently, the agencies had sprawling, ill-
defined, and contested missions, which they have struggled to fully 
implement.188 
Despite these challenges, the river basin commissions live on. 
But they are rarely cited as model agencies,189 and we view them 
as exemplars of both the challenges and the possibilities of joint 
federal-state governance. 
 
183 This would not be true where the agency’s job is only to generate information and 
facilitate communication, but not to regulate. Such an agency might provide its greatest 
value in a messy field where responsibilities are not clearly defined. 
184 See, e.g., DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, STATE OF THE BASIN 2019, at 1–2 (2019), 
https://www.state.nj.us/drbc/library/documents/SOTBreport_july2019.pdf (describing the 
many influences on the Delaware River). 
185 See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1, 21–23 (describing the Delaware River Basin Commission’s recent and 
aborted foray into fracking regulation). 
186 The Delaware River Basin and Susquehanna River Basin Compacts were introduced 
in 1961 and 1969, respectively. See DERTHICK, supra note 17, at 46, 73. 
187 See id. at 62 (noting that after the passage of the Water Control Act of 1965, the 
Delaware River Basin Commission “served as a medium for interstate coordination of 
standards . . . . [But] the federal and state governments proceeded as if the commission did 
not exist”). 
188 See id at 195–97 (enumerating the various responsibilities of the federal agencies). 
189 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, JAMES W. SAWYER, JR. & 
DALE W. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 167–68 
(1974) (arguing that the Delaware River Basin Commission’s structure was dysfunctional). 
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***** 
These four criteria for joint federal-state governance are likely 
to be met in a variety of other contexts. For example, although 
Clean Air Act administration would likely be an unwieldly disaster 
if performed by a fifty-state federal-state commission, discrete 
issues within the Act—such as the regional transport of air 
pollutants—have benefited from governance that somewhat 
resembles a joint federal-state approach.190 And while we have 
focused on energy and environmental examples because that is 
where our expertise lies, we suspect many other realms may exist 
where joint governance holds promise. Healthcare, business and 
financial regulation, immigration, and other policy arenas might 
hold intriguing possibilities for joint governance, which we hope 
policymakers and other researchers will explore. 
Nevertheless, as shown by the interstate water commissions, 
not all situations will be ideal for a formal federal-state approach. 
And even when this approach does appear promising, it may 
encounter constitutional challenges. We turn to those challenges 
in the following Part. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JOINT FEDERAL-STATE 
GOVERNANCE 
The U.S. Constitution is commonly perceived, above all else, as 
a document mandating separation of powers.191 It divides power 
among the several branches of government and between the 
federal government and the states.192 At the same time, the 
 
190 See, e.g., Ozone Transport Commission NOx Budget Program, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/ozone-transport-commission-nox-budget-program (last 
updated July 19, 2019) (describing the historical multi-state and Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) effort to address the emissions of ground-level ozone-forming air pollutants 
that move across state borders). The EPA has subsequently issued other ozone transport 
rules, and the Ozone Transport Commission continues to advise the EPA on ozone transport 
issues and the need for individual limits on ozone-forming air pollutants within states. See 
OZONE TRANSP. COMMISSION, https://otcair.org/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2020) (explaining that 
the purpose of the Commission is to “advis[e] [the] EPA on transport issues and for 
developing and implementing regional solutions to the ground-level ozone problem in the 
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions”). 
191 See supra Section III.A. 
192 See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
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Constitution is a document of governmental empowerment. Within 
their respective spheres, it envisions an energetic executive, a 
Congress with broad legislative authority, a robust and 
independent judiciary, and vital and strong states.193 A joint 
federal-state agency might seem to complicate these relationships. 
It combines, rather than separates, federal and state power and 
does so in relatively novel ways.194 In other key respects, it deflects 
traditional power arrangements. Most importantly, it raises the 
possibility that the federal government or a state will be bound by 
a rule or order to which its own representative(s) dissented.195 
That possibility, and the broader rearrangement of power that a 
joint federal-state agency accomplishes, likely would raise 
constitutional questions. Indeed, constitutional issues have often 
swirled around joint federal-state agencies. In the early 1960s, for 
example, when states sought federal participation in the Delaware 
River Basin Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice and 
Department of the Interior were deeply skeptical of the proposal, 
partly on constitutional grounds.196 The Department of Justice 
ultimately produced a memorandum tepidly attesting to the 
proposal’s constitutionality,197 but only so long as the federal 
executive branch could reject the commission’s positions198—a 
condition that Congress accepted.199 In the 1990s, concerns with 
 
193 U.S. CONST. art. I–III (vesting legislative, executive, and judicial power within three 
separate branches); id. amend. X (reserving to the states powers not expressly delegated to 
the federal government). 
194 See supra Section III.E. 
195 See infra Section IV.D.2. 
196 See DERTHICK, supra note 17, at 49–53 (discussing the constitutional concerns raised 
by the U.S. Department of Justice and Department of the Interior). 
197 Memorandum from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, to the Honorable Frederick G. Dutton, Special Assistant to the President 2 
(Apr. 25, 1961) (on file with the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library) (“In our opinion, the 
Compact does not clearly violate any specific provisions of the Federal Constitution.”). 
198 See id. at 14 (“The federal commissioner could not exercise such power over federal 
regulatory agencies.”). 
199 See DERTHICK, supra note 17, at 53 (“The reservation added at the request of the 
federal executive agencies states that the federal government will not be bound by any 
provision of the comprehensive plan unless the federal member has concurred in it.”). One 
of Derthick’s recurring themes is federal executive ambivalence toward the Commission. 
E.g., id. at 66 (“[The federal commissioner] is supposed to represent within the commission 
the interests of a government that has never been convinced that its interests are served by 
his being there.”). 
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constitutionality helped forestall the creation of a joint federal-
state water regulator in California, again leading to the creation of 
a weaker agency that was then widely criticized for its 
ineffectiveness.200 More recently, litigants have challenged the 
constitutionality of the Metropolitan Washington Airports 
Authority (MWAA), a joint federal-state agency that, according to 
its opponents, occupies “a delegation twilight zone sheltered from 
separation-of-powers constraints.”201 The Fourth Circuit rejected 
those arguments,202 and the U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.203 But similar claims could easily arise again. 
In short, while specific constitutional arguments have evolved, 
some constitutional uncertainty has always accompanied proposals 
for joint federal-state entities and has rarely been squarely 
addressed. This Part therefore analyzes constitutional questions 
that could impede more widespread use of joint federal-state 
governance. We begin with specific issues before moving to more 
thematic concerns, explaining why each attack should fail.204 
While our analysis consists of a series of responses to potential 
constitutional challenges, an affirmative argument pervades this 
discussion. Both the Constitution itself and the Framers’ other 
written works anticipate that states and the federal government 
would interact through a combination of contestation and 
 
200 See Freeman & Farber, supra note 97, at 854 (discussing how “lawyers for both state 
and federal agencies resisted creating a truly new joint federal-state agency because of 
concerns about the constitutionality and legality of federal and state entities having a say in 
each other’s activities”). As Freeman and Farber note, the non-regulatory agency that the 
state and federal governments created did achieve some successes, but it ultimately was 
unsuccessful in resolving the primary disputes it faced. Id. at 866–76 (discussing the 
shortcomings of the CalFed Agency). 
201 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, Kerpen v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 140 
S. Ct. 132 (2019) (mem.) (No. 18-1240). 
202 Kerpen v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 907 F.3d 152, 160–63 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding 
that the MWAA does not exercise any extra-constitutional powers). 
203 Kerpen v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 140 S. Ct. 132 (2019) (mem.). 
204 Because modes of constitutional analysis are contested, we offer a brief word about the 
ground rules we will use. The discussion that follows draws on constitutional text and 
structure, documentary evidence from the period before and after the Constitution’s 
enactment, governing precedent, and broader principles of effective and fair governance. It 
is, in other words, a somewhat conventional, though obviously contestable, comprehensive 
approach to constitutional interpretation. See generally Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, 
Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability Problem, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1739 (2013) 
(describing and critiquing interpretive theories).  
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collaboration.205 Much of the academic discussion of federalism, 
and most of the Court’s recent federalism rhetoric, emphasizes the 
contestation, which leads all too easily to a focus on separation.206 
But the Framers also wanted successful collaboration, and they 
understood the importance of robust governance.207 The 
Constitution’s text therefore leaves ample room for creative 
federal-state governance arrangements that correspond to complex 
and evolving governance needs,208 and joint federal-state agencies 
are one such arrangement. 
The following discussion focuses entirely on the U.S. 
Constitution. That is because a joint federal-state agency requires 
federal authorizing legislation, and under the Supremacy Clause, 
that legislation removes any basis for state law objections to such 
an agency.209 That principle was at the heart of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims,210 the one 
case we are aware of in which a state’s participation in a joint 
federal-state agency was questioned as a potential violation of 
state constitutional law. Justice Frankfurter (who had earlier 
written a law review article praising compact agencies211) rejected 
that challenge, concluding that federal approval of legislation 
 
205 See infra Section IV.D.1. 
206 See supra Section III.A. But see Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 19, at 1903–04 
(emphasizing the potential for constructive conflict in shared governance regimes). 
207 See infra notes 329–333 and accompanying text (noting that the Constitution’s 
structure and the Framers’ writings anticipate some intertwinement of federal and state 
governance). 
208 See Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 
1602–03 (2014) (arguing that the Constitution’s flexible terms leave room for negotiation 
among branches and between levels of government). 
209 These principles do not preclude a state from identifying constitutional reasons, or 
political reasons, for declining to enter a compact. But they do bar a state from arguing that 
an already-approved compact agency is operating in violation of state law. See West 
Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27–32 (1951) (observing that despite West 
Virginia’s interpretation of its laws, “the State has bound itself to control pollution by the 
more effective means of an agreement with other States” and noting that the state’s 
obligation did not conflict with the state’s constitution). 
210 341 U.S. 22 (1951). 
211 See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution—A 
Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 729 (1925) (“The imaginative adaptation 
of the compact idea should add considerably to resources available to statesmen in the 
solution of problems presented by the growing interdependence, social and economic, of 
groups of States forming distinct regions.”). 
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forming the agency overrode state-law objections.212 In later 
decisions, federal courts have reduced this analysis to a simple 
rule: a federally-approved state compact becomes federal law, and 
once that happens, “it l[ies] beyond the judicial power of any party 
state to declare the Agreement not binding upon the state, even on 
state constitutional grounds, . . . and its provisions, interpreted as 
federal law, must prevail over any . . . provisions of state law in 
direct conflict.”213 Consequently, the constitution that matters, for 
purposes of our discussion, is the federal one.214 
A. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
The dormant Commerce Clause—a doctrine implied from the 
Commerce Clause—might seem, at first blush, to impede the 
operations of any joint federal-state agency. The doctrine prohibits 
states from unduly interfering with Congress’s Commerce Clause 
authority.215 More specifically, it requires strict scrutiny review of 
state actions that discriminate against out-of-state commerce by, 
for example, placing a higher tax on waste imported from other 
states.216 The doctrine also mandates balancing of state and local 
 
212 See Sims, 341 U.S. at 28 (“It requires no elaborate argument to reject the suggestion 
that an agreement solemnly entered into between States . . . can be unilaterally nullified, or 
given final meaning by an organ of one of the contracting States. A State cannot be its own 
ultimate judge in a controversy with a sister State.”). 
213 Bush v. Muncy, 659 F.2d 402, 410 (4th Cir. 1981) (first citing Sims, 341 U.S. at 28; 
then citing Del. River Joint Toll Bridge Comm’n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419, 429–30 (1940)). 
214 Conceivably, this might change. The reasoning of Sims contains whiffs of tension with 
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Bond v. United States, which argued that the federal 
government could not use a treaty to grant itself powers not otherwise provided by the 
Constitution. 572 U.S 844, 873–76 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the 
holding of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920)). By analogy, one might argue that a 
state cannot use a compact to confer upon itself powers not granted by the state 
constitution. A compact is different from a treaty because the federal government’s 
Supremacy Clause power has no analogue in international law. Nevertheless, one can 
imagine an opinion that combines Justice Scalia’s rationale in Bond with federalism-based 
arguments in favor of state autonomy to overrule or limit Sims and related cases. That has 
not yet happened, and for this discussion we assume that it will not happen. 
215 See Int’l Truck & Engine Corp. v. Bray, 372 F.3d 717, 724–25 (5th. Cir. 2004) (“The 
dormant Commerce Clause, also known as the negative Commerce Clause, prohibits states 
from engaging in economic protectionism.”). 
216 See Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1203, 1236 (1986) (describing the strict scrutiny review and noting that “[n]ot only 
must the state have a legitimate interest, its regulation must be substantially related to 
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interests against impediments to commerce when a state policy 
indirectly affects out-of-state commerce,217 and it outright 
prohibits extraterritorial regulation.218 These prohibitions might 
appear violated if, for example, a joint federal-multistate 
commission regulates transactions between buyers and sellers in 
the same state. The problems might seem particularly acute if that 
state’s representatives had voted against the prices or the 
approval.219 
A second type of dormant Commerce Clause objection could 
come from states and private entities outside of the federal-state 
agency. For example, states that decline to join a federal-state 
compact to manage a shared river might view the entire compact 
as discriminatory, giving non-member states less access to water 
than they might otherwise claim.220 Similarly, generators in states 
outside of a region with a low-carbon energy initiative might claim 
that market priorities for lower-carbon resources discriminate 
 
that interest”); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) 
(holding that Oregon’s surcharge on waste from other states was facially discriminatory). 
217 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates 
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, . . . the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will . . . 
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as 
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.” (citation omitted)). 
218 See North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 922 (8th Cir. 2016) (concluding that a 
Minnesota statute that limited carbon emissions invalidly exercised extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and would require Congressional approval); Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. 
Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the Court generally strikes down a 
state statute that “directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce”). 
219 This would be a non-issue if the agency made decisions by consensus. 
220 Some have argued that an act that achieved a similar goal violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause. The federal Water Resources Development Act of 1986 prohibited 
entities from diverting water away from the Great Lakes without the consent of the 
governors of all eight states within the Great Lakes basin. See Pub. L. No. 99-662, § 1109, 
100 Stat. 4082, 4230 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20). An attorney for the Council of Great 
Lakes Governors argued that this prohibition on out-of-region diversions violated the 
dormant Commerce Clause, noting that although Congress may waive the dormant 
Commerce Clause, it had not unambiguously done so under the WRDA. See Mark Squillace, 
Rethinking the Great Lakes Compact, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1347, 1353 n.51 (describing 
and critiquing the Lochhead memorandum, which made this argument). 
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against their product, which they otherwise could sell in that 
region.221 
For a joint federal-state agency, however, existing doctrine 
holds a ready answer to these potential dormant Commerce Clause 
claims. That answer comes from (among other cases) a decision 
better known for its anti-commandeering discussion. In New York 
v. United States, the Court observed that Congress may delegate 
its Commerce Clause authority to states, and may also allow 
states to burden interstate commerce, simply through “an 
expression of [its] ‘unambiguous intent.’”222 Other cases have 
developed a “coordinated action” theory, concluding that Congress 
may exercise its interstate commerce authority “in conjunction 
with coordinated action by the states.”223 In this sense, when the 
federal government works with the states to address an issue, it is 
as if state boundaries have been temporarily erased, and the 
federal government is sweeping up the willing states in a broader 
cross-border initiative. 
Consequently, if the federal legislation approving a joint 
federal-state agency demonstrates this unambiguous intent, the 
agency could proceed without dormant Commerce Clause 
concerns.224 While some scholars have questioned whether 
Congress can waive an implied constitutional protection such as 
the dormant Commerce Clause,225 that ability remains firmly 
embedded within U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.226 
 
221 See, e.g., Heydinger, 825 F.3d at 922 (disapproving a similar state arrangement on 
grounds of extraterritoriality). But see Energy & Envtl. Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 
1171 (10th Cir. 2015) (reaching a holding contrary to Heydinger).  
222 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167, 171 (1992) (quoting Wyoming v. 
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992)).  
223 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946). But see Norman R. 
Williams, Why Congress May Not “Overrule” the Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 153, 189–93 (2005) (describing and critiquing Benjamin).  
224 See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 7, at 219 (discussing legislative provisions, which New York 
v. United States did not set aside, allowing states that participated in compacts to limit 
interstate commerce in nuclear waste); see also Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amendment 
Infrastructure, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 31–34 (2010) (describing states’ compact approach to 
nuclear waste). 
225 See Williams, supra note 223, at 195 (“[I]t makes no sense from a theoretical 
perspective to view the Dormant Commerce Clause as existing for the benefit of, and 
therefore waivable by, Congress.”). Williams’s concerns might be lessened if the delegation 
were to an agency involving the federal government, particularly if—as would likely be true 
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B. ANTI-COMMANDEERING 
The anti-commandeering doctrine, which arises both from the 
Tenth Amendment of the Constitution and from broader structural 
concerns surrounding the division of federal-state authority, might 
also present problems for joint federal-state agencies.227 This 
doctrine protects state governments from direct federal control.228 
Accordingly, Congress may not compel or prohibit state 
legislation,229 and it may not force state officials to implement a 
federal directive.230 For example, Congress may not require state 
and local police to carry out background checks for individuals 
proposing to purchase guns, as this is an unconstitutional federal 
“conscript[ion]” of subnational actors to do Congress’s bidding.231 
Nor may Congress force states to pass legislation that takes title to 
and assumes liability for nuclear waste,232 or prohibit state 
legislation that legalizes sports gambling.233 
A joint federal-state agency would raise anti-commandeering 
concerns. The agency would not compel states to legislate, but a 
joint federal-state agency would issue directives that state 
regulators would have to implement. Because the agency directive 
could be characterized as federal—at least one federal member 
 
with energy—the agency would promote interstate commerce. See Klass & Rossi, supra note 
158, at 181–84 (describing Arizona and Missouri’s denials of proposed interstate 
transmission lines and arguing that these could be viewed as dormant Commerce Clause 
violations). 
226 See Williams, supra note 223, at 194 (acknowledging that the Court allows Congress to 
waive dormant Commerce Clause restrictions). 
227 See RYAN, supra note 7, at 250 (acknowledging the Tenth Amendment and the 
Constitution’s structure as the foundation of the anti-commandeering doctrine). 
228 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (“The Federal Government 
may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”).  
229 See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018) (expanding New York’s holding to 
include a bar against the federal government prohibiting a state from enacting certain 
legislation). 
230 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“The Federal Government may 
neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command 
the States’ officers . . . to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”). 
231 Id.  
232 New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (holding that the Constitution “does not . . . authorize 
Congress simply to direct the States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste 
generated within their borders”). 
233 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478 (holding that a federal law “prohibiting state authorization 
of sports gambling—violates the anticommandeering rule”). 
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may have voted for it, and it would be binding as federal law—the 
directive could be viewed as unacceptable commandeering. And a 
litigant challenging that alleged commandeering would likely rely 
on some of the broad language from New York v. United States, 
which suggests skepticism of commandeering even when its goal is 
to solve a collective action problem faced by states.234 Prior to New 
York, states—working through the National Governors’ 
Association—had bargained extensively for federal legislation 
designed to compel all states to help solve the problem of siting 
landfills for radioactive waste.235 Congress accepted the states’ 
bargain—a deal in which states planned to join a compact—in lieu 
of enacting legislation that could have preempted the states 
entirely.236 But the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the resulting 
federal legislation, concluding that “[w]here Congress exceeds its 
authority relative to the States . . . the departure from the 
constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state 
officials.”237 
Taken to the extreme, this New York statement would suggest 
that the states cannot cede authority to a joint federal-state 
agency even if they wish to do so. But several lines of reasoning 
prevent this potentially crippling outcome. First, New York itself is 
readily distinguishable. Though the case arose out of interstate 
bargaining—through which states indicated that they would form 
compacts, and forty-two of them ultimately did—New York had 
not actually approved a compact, and thus the federal legislation 
at issue was not authorized by the Compact Clause.238 For a joint 
 
234 See New York, 505 U.S. at 182 (holding that states “cannot consent” to an otherwise 
commandeering law). 
235 See id. at 193–94 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (outlining the 
states’ actions prior to the adoption of the federal act at issue). 
236 See id. at 195–96 (noting the states’ contribution to the federal act at issue). 
237 Id. at 182 (majority opinion). See also RYAN, supra note 7, at 250, 253 (discussing the 
New York holding and describing it as an inalienability rule under the Calabresi-Melamed 
framework for Coasean bargaining—an entitlement that states may not bargain away even 
if they wish to); Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial 
Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 482 (2002) 
(describing the anti-commandeering protection of state sovereignty as inalienable).  
238 New York, 505 U.S. at 183 (“The fact that the Act, like much federal legislation, 
embodies a compromise among the States does not elevate the Act (or the antecedent 
discussions among representatives of the States) to the status of an interstate agreement 
requiring Congress’ approval under the Compact Clause.”); see also Ryan, supra note 224, at 
32–35 (describing the deal, the legislation, and New York’s subsequent actions).  
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federal-state agency, in contrast, that Compact Clause 
authorization would exist. Second, a regulatory scheme that 
federal legislation compels states to join is profoundly different 
from a regulatory scheme that states enter and exit at their 
legislatures’ discretion. The latter is not, in any meaningful sense, 
commandeering the state, even if its day-to-day commands may be 
binding upon state administrative officials.239 Nor is it particularly 
novel, for even outside of existing federal-state agencies, analogous 
practices exist. Erin Ryan has extensively discussed states’ 
regular, permissible waivers of their Tenth Amendment authority 
outside of the anti-commandeering context.240 She notes not just 
that states give up Eleventh Amendment immunity, but also that 
states regularly waive their authority under the Spending Clause, 
agreeing to accept federal funds in exchange for weakened 
autonomy.241 
Although the anti-commandeering doctrine should not preclude 
the existence of a joint federal-state agency, the doctrine could 
limit its structure and operations. Federal legislation could not 
compel states to participate in the agency, though the federal 
government could encourage participation by offering it as an 
alternative to preemption or by offering financial inducements.242 
Additionally, the federal government could not direct states to 
appoint or remove particular state members of the governing 
commission.243 But so long as the states control their own 
participation, they would not be commandeered. 
 
239 Cf. Ryan, supra note 224, at 88 (“[T]he [New York Court’s] defense of the Tenth 
Amendment inalienability rule . . . was substantially undermined by dicta implying that 
even though New York State could not waive its citizens' entitlement to the federal 
government in negotiating a resolution to the crisis, it might have succeeded in doing so had 
it joined an interstate compact and waived the same sovereign authority directly to other 
states.”). 
240 Id. at 46 (noting that “States routinely waive . . . their Tenth Amendment sovereign 
authority to other states in interstate compacts”). 
241 Id. (“States routinely waive their Eleventh Amendment entitlement to sovereign 
authority to private litigants . . . .”); see also id. at 47 (“[T]he Court’s proposition that needed 
interjurisdictional collaboration can always take place through spending-power negotiations 
raises the fair question whether the entitlement is really alienable after all.”).  
242 See New York, 505 U.S. at 187 (recounting how the federal government used financial 
incentives to encourage states to participate in a radioactive waste disposal program). 
243 Cf. id. at 188 (“The positions occupied by state officials appear nowhere on the Federal 
Government's most detailed organizational chart.”). 
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C. DELEGATION, APPOINTMENT, AND REMOVAL 
In the form of joint federal-state agency we have proposed, 
state-appointed actors whose activities are authorized by state and 
federal law may take actions that bind the federal government. To 
avoid a commandeering issue, the federal government cannot itself 
appoint those state actors, nor could it remove them.244 That 
circumstance raises a host of interrelated constitutional issues 
which can be distilled to a single question: may Congress delegate 
implementation of federal law to a commission partly composed of 
state officials who are neither appointed nor removable by the 
President?245 The Court’s increasingly formalist246 constitutional 
jurisprudence provides reasons to think the answer is “no.” But, as 
we explain below, delegation to a joint federal-state agency would 
not violate either constitutional text or principle. 
1. Delegation. Under current standards, constitutional 
delegation doctrine addresses two issues. The first, for which the 
Court has supplied a clear standard, is what level of guidance 
must accompany Congress’s delegations of authority—so long as 
those delegations supply an “intelligible principle,” which as of this 
writing remains a capacious concept, the delegation is 
constitutional.247 The muddier question, and the one centrally at 
issue here, is to whom Congress may delegate authority. 
Obviously, administrative agencies within the federal executive 
branch are lawful recipients of delegated authority, but what 
about a non- or a partially federal entity? 
 
244 See id. 
245 See Katzenbach, supra note 197, at 12–14 (answering this question in the affirmative). 
246 But see Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers 
Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346, 435 (2016) (“Across a wide variety of doctrinal contexts, 
the Court cycles between rules and standards, and back again. This cycling cuts across and 
blends the categories of formalism and functionalism.”). 
247 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–75 (2001) (describing the 
“intelligible principle” standard). In Gundy v. United States, four justices (with Justice 
Kavanaugh not participating) expressed willingness to revisit the delegation doctrine. 139 
S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring) (“If a majority of this Court were willing to 
reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”); 
id. at 2139 (Gorsuch & Thomas, JJ., and Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“This mutated version of 
the ‘intelligible principle’ remark has no basis in the original meaning of the Constitution, 
in history, or even in the decision from which it was plucked.”). 
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One conceivable answer is that no such delegation is 
permissible. The Constitution vests executive authority in the 
President,248 and some commentators and justices have suggested 
that Article II’s Vesting Clause prohibits Congressional 
delegations of executive authority to anyone but the President or 
subordinates whom the President controls.249 As then-Judge 
Kavanaugh put it (echoing Justice Scalia’s famous dissent in 
Morrison v. Olson250), Article II requires “not some of the executive 
power, but all of it” to be vested in the President.251 If that is the 
correct reading, one potential implication is that delegation to a 
state official is unconstitutional.252 Such a prohibition on 
delegations to non-federal entities has never been adopted by the 
Court or explicitly endorsed by any of the Justices, but some 
scholars have warned that it soon could,253 or that it should.254 
 
248 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a 
President . . . .”). 
249 E.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To Execute 
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 581–82, 595–96 (1994) (arguing that Congress cannot delegate 
executive powers to entities outside the President’s control). In Calabresi and Prakash’s 
view, this principle does not prevent delegations to state officials, but the President must be 
able to select the delegate, approve or reject their positions, and remove them from 
authority—which current U.S. Supreme Court precedent would not allow. Id. at 595–97, 
639–42. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (rejecting federal authority to 
commandeer state officials). 
250 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
251 In re Aiken Cty., 645 F.3d 428, 439 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In his 
Morrison dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that Article II’s vesting clause “does not mean some 
of the executive power, but all of the executive power.” 487 U.S. at 705. 
252 See Harold J. Krent, Federal Power, Non-Federal Actors: The Ramifications of Free 
Enterprise Fund, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2426 (2011) (“The recent Supreme Court 
decision therefore may toll congressional experimentation to vest executive authority in 
private and state hands.”). 
253 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, and the 
Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential 
Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1610 
(2012) (arguing that the Roberts Court is moving toward invalidating “cooperative-
federalism programs on the ground that they unconstitutionally delegate the enforcement of 
federal law outside the executive branch”); Krent, supra note 252, at 2426 (noting that Free 
Enterprise Fund may restrict Congress’s ability “to vest executive authority in . . . state 
hands”). 
254 See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, 
and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 211 (1997) (“The Supreme Court should 
therefore find that delegations to states of overbroad federal regulatory powers violate the 
Constitution . . . to assure that officials imposing federal policies can be held accountable to 
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Nevertheless, current practice, historic practice, and textual 
arguments all suggest that a joint federal-state agency should not 
raise a difficult delegation issue. In practice, delegations to non-
federal entities abound. Some of those entities are private 
companies,255 some are quasi-public corporate entities,256 and some 
defy simple labeling,257 but many of the delegates are state 
agencies.258 Cooperative federalism programs, which pervade 
American governance, rely heavily on delegations of implementing 
authority to state agencies.259 In most of these programs, federal 
executive agencies maintain oversight, but that oversight does not 
translate into complete control.260 Additionally, many federal laws 
confer enforcement authority on state officials, and the Court has 
rarely questioned those delegations.261 Some federal statutes even 
reverse the traditional hierarchies and make federal agency 
decisions subservient to state regulators’ decisions.262 Nor are 
 
all federal citizens and thus will adopt better policies.” (footnotes omitted)). Sarnoff does not 
argue for a categorical ban; instead, he argues for a functional analysis that considers 
whether the delegation leaves enough federal accountability intact. See id. at 270–80 
(outlining a functional approach). 
255 See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369 
(2003) (describing the growing extent of delegations to private entities). 
256 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 856 
(2014) (describing government corporations, such as Amtrak). 
257 Id. at 857–61 (describing several difficult-to-classify entities). 
258 See Heather K. Gerken, Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 116 
(2014) (emphasizing the importance of delegated federal power to state governance). 
259 See Owen, supra note 107, at 179 (describing how the federal government delegates 
“program implementation” power to states “[u]nder the classic cooperative federalism 
model”). 
260 See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 19, at 1263 (explaining how cooperative 
federalism schemes provide states with opportunities to “resist” federal power and 
“empower states to challenge federal authority”). 
261 See Leah M. Litman, Taking Care of Federal Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1289, 1308 (2015) 
(analyzing instances where Congress has “carve[d] out a role for the states in implementing 
a federal scheme”); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 698, 700 (2011) (explaining that Congress can confer enforcement authority to state 
attorney generals through federal laws that “authorize civil enforcement by . . . the states”). 
262 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (requiring applicants for federal discharge permits to 
obtain state certifications that the permittees’ activities will be consistent with state water 
quality standards); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 103 (1992) (describing Clean Water 
Act section 401 as “prohibit[ing] the issuance of any federal license or permit over the 
objection of an affected State unless compliance with the affected State’s water quality 
requirements can be ensured”); California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 674 (1978) 
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these arrangements new. As Jerry Mashaw has shown, 
delegations beyond the sometimes-blurry boundaries of the federal 
government began in the nation’s earliest years.263 And while some 
commentators have argued that these arrangements are 
unconstitutional or have worried that the Court might so hold,264 
the Court has not yet done so, even though delegations to state 
agencies have often come before it.265 
For some constitutional theorists, the pervasiveness of this 
practice will mean little; present actions, they would argue, shed 
no light on the meaning of a document drafted centuries ago.266 
But there are also textual and theoretical reasons why these 
delegations to non-federal entities should be permissible—albeit 
with some possible limitations. While one can conceivably 
interpret the U.S. Constitution’s statement that “[t]he executive 
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America,”267 as saying that no one except the President can have 
authority over the execution of federal law, the terse text falls well 
short of commanding that interpretation.268 One alternative 
reading is that this phrase clarifies that the President—rather 
than Congress or the courts—will be the entity within the federal 
government that holds executive authority.269 If that is true, then 
 
(holding that the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation must obtain water rights and operate its 
water projects in compliance with state law). 
263 JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 298 (2012) (“[F]rom 
the beginning, coordinate forms of lawmaking and administrative implementation have 
been a part of our institutional arrangements.”). 
264 E.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 253, at 1610 (explaining that the Court may “invalidate 
cooperative-federalism programs”). 
265 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (affirming the 
constitutionality of cooperative federalism schemes); see Litman, supra note 261, at 1290 
(“[T]he Court has gone out of its way to preserve the states’ ability to enforce federal 
law . . . .”). 
266 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 249, at 554 (arguing that “postenactment 
legislative history” is a poor tool for constitutional interpretation). 
267 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
268 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (observing that the Constitution’s provisions on executive power are “almost as 
enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh”); Victoria 
Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case of Executive Power, 
106 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 22–24 (2008) (outlining various interpretations of the Vesting Clause 
offered by U.S. Supreme Court Justices). 
269 Whether the President must hold all of the federal government’s executive authority is 
a subject of vigorous debate. Compare Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, 
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the phrase would not address authority vested outside the federal 
government. That reading is consistent with the expectation, 
reflected in both the Supremacy Clause and the Founding Fathers’ 
writings, that state actors would give effect to federal law.270 
In short, a delegation argument against a joint federal-state 
agency—while arguably consistent with a strongly formalistic 
constitutional interpretation—is neither mandated by the 
Constitution’s text nor supported by precedent and would mark a 
radical shift in our governance systems by undercutting state 
authority in many realms. 
2. Appointment. Overlapping concerns might arise with 
appointment of state members of a joint federal-state agency. The 
Constitution prescribes appointment of federal officials through 
just two procedures: principal officers may be appointed only by 
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate; and 
inferior officers may be appointed by the President, the heads of 
departments, or the courts.271 A governor is not mentioned, so if 
the state members of a joint federal-state commission are, in fact, 
federal officers, then their appointment by a state governor clearly 
would be unconstitutional. The key question, then, is whether 
those commissioners are state or federal officers—or both. 
Although there are arguments for all three classifications, the 
arguments for treating state appointees as state officers are 
stronger. 
The argument for a federal classification is straightforward: all 
members of the federal-state agency will participate in a 
 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the President must hold “all of the executive power”), with 
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640–41 (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that the Constitution’s 
enumeration of specific executive powers undercuts arguments for a more general executive 
power), and Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The 
Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 967–69 (2001) (arguing that the Constitution’s 
text does not give the President complete authority). Though potentially informed by 
similar considerations, the question of whether Congress may delegate authority to 
independent federal agencies differs from the question of whether Congress may delegate 
authority to a state or joint federal-state agency.  
270 See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 
1995–2004 (1993) (outlining evidence of this expectation at the founding). 
271 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States . . . but the 
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, 
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”). 
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government entity with three attributes that might make it seem 
quite “federal.” First, the agency will be authorized by the 
Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution.272 Second, the agency 
will not exist absent Congressional action.273 Third, its decisions 
will bind federal agencies.274 If it walks, talks, and quacks like a 
federal duck, the argument will go, perhaps that is exactly what it 
is. 
But powerful counterarguments exist. A federal-state entity 
would also owe its existence to state legislation and would issue 
decisions that bind state entities, too; it would be a genuinely joint 
entity. And if the elected branches of federal and state 
governments choose to create such an entity, and choose to treat 
its federally- and state-appointed members as representing 
separate governments, that choice merits some respect.275 
Additionally, both in practice and in doctrine, we have long 
accepted a distinction between implementing federal law and 
being a federal officer.276 The state attorney generals (and private 
plaintiffs)277 who enforce federal law278 and the state agency 
officials who implement federally authorized cooperative 
federalism programs do not lose their state status just because the 
 
272 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . 
enter into any agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”). 
273 See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
274 See supra notes 16, 46–49 and accompanying text (discussing the legal status of 
compact agencies). 
275 See Huq, supra note 208, at 1602 (arguing that judges should respect, and generally 
not attempt to regulate, power-sharing bargains struck by constitutionally empowered 
actors). 
276 See Officers of the United States within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 
Op. O.L.C. 73, 99 (2007) (“State officers, even when enforcing federal law, generally exercise 
the sovereign law enforcement authority of their state, ultimately delegated by the people of 
that state; if they hold any office, they are officers of their state or locality, not of the United 
States.” (emphasis added)); The Constitutional Separation of Powers between the President 
and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 145 (1996) (expressing the same principle in different 
words). 
277 See Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 341–
43 (1989) (describing qui tam actions, in which a private plaintiff vindicates a broad public 
interest protected by federal law).  
278 See Lemos, supra note 261, at 700 (“Many federal statutes authorize civil enforcement 
by both a federal agency and the states, typically through states’ attorneys general.”). 
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law they implement comes from the federal government.279 
Neither, then, should the state-appointed representatives in a 
federal-state body lose their ability to function as state officials.280 
3. Removal. Intertwined with the delegation and appointment 
questions would be issues about removal. While the Constitution 
says nothing explicit about removal authority, judges and 
commentators have long accepted that some presidential authority 
to remove officials flows from the vesting of executive power in the 
President and from the Article II directive that the President “take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”281 This removal 
authority, the Court has held, is not absolute; as long as a removal 
restriction does not limit the President’s ability to carry out duties 
that are “central to the functioning of the Executive Branch,” 
Congress may provide good-cause protection to administrative 
officials.282 But the Court has never sanctioned complete immunity 
from removal.283 Consequently, if the state appointees on a joint 
federal-state commission are classified as federal officials, the 
President’s complete inability to fire them would likely create an 
insurmountable constitutional problem.284 Some commentators 
have taken these arguments a step further and suggested that the 
President might need to have authority to terminate anyone 
charged with implementing federal law, regardless of the official’s 
classification as federal or state.285 
 
279 See Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the 
Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1695–97 (2001) (describing the 
basic architecture of cooperative federalism programs). 
280 See Seattle Master Builders Ass’n. v. Pac. Nw. Elec. Power & Conservation Planning 
Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1364–66 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a compact agency’s officials 
need not be appointed by the federal government). The agency in question did not have any 
federally appointed commissioners. Id. 
281 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
282 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988). 
283 See, e.g., id. at 696 (noting that the Attorney General may remove independent counsel 
for “good cause”). 
284 See Seila Law L.L.C. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020) 
(stating that the Court’s “precedents have recognized only two exceptions to the President’s 
unrestricted removal power,” neither of which would apply in the context of a joint agency). 
285 See Krotoszynski, supra note 253, at 1663–68 (discussing various arguments for why 
the President would need heightened removal power over state actors for a cooperative 
federalism scheme to be sufficiently effective); Evan Caminker, The Unitary Executive and 
State Administration of Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1075, 1091–94 (1997) (elaborating 
on the methods by which a President could remove state officials administering federal law 
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Underlying these textual arguments are broader concerns with 
the accountability of administrative agencies. “The diffusion of 
power,” the Court has warned, “carries with it a diffusion of 
accountability.”286 The consequent fear is that executive authority 
“may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from that of the 
people.”287 Some Justices have traditionally responded to such 
fears by arguing that creative governance arrangements respond 
to the realities of contemporary society, and that the procedural 
and substantive constraints of administrative law supply ample 
accountability and oversight.288 But the Court’s conservatives have 
expressed growing disdain for arguments grounded in “the era’s 
perceived necessity.”289 That disdain, combined with the 
willingness of at least some of the conservative justices to 
drastically limit the scope of administrative governance,290 
suggests that arguments against joint federal-state agencies may 
gain traction. 
To a large extent, the responses to these potential arguments 
would echo the responses to arguments about appointment and 
removal. State appointees on a federal-state commission would be 
just that—state appointees.291 Consequently, if they must be 
removable by the President, their removability would flow from a 
principle that all people with significant authority to implement 
 
without violating the Constitution); see also Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary 
Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal 
Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 69–80 (1990) (discussing congressional delegation of 
removal power to the President, where state actors are enforcing federal law). None of these 
articles offer a full-throated endorsement of this position. Krotoszynski and Caminker argue 
only that it follows from other U.S. Supreme Court decisions. See Krotoszynski, supra note 
253, at 1669; Caminker, supra at 1111–12. Krent, though committed to a unitary executive 
approach, suggests that a countervailing federalism principle could justify delegations to 
the states. Krent, supra at 110–12. 
286 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497 (2010). 
287 Id. at 499. 
288 See, e.g., id. at 519–49 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing for and applying a “functional 
approach,” after arguing that no textual provision decides the issue at hand); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 207 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part) (criticizing the 
majority for offering a “civics lecture . . . at a time when action, rather than rhetoric, is 
needed to solve a national problem”). 
289 Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 501 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 187). 
290 See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 70 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (arguing that it is unconstitutional for administrative agencies to create 
“generally applicable rules of private conduct”). 
291 See supra note 276 & 280 and accompanying text. 
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federal law must be subject to removal by the President.292 Such a 
holding would be fatal to not only joint federal-state agencies, but 
also to cooperative federalism more generally.293 The Court has 
never gone nearly that far, and for good reason. The Take Care 
Clause is an awfully thin reed upon which to rest such a sweeping 
holding. It is, after all, just a few ambiguous words,294 with passive 
voice obscuring the identity of the law implementer(s) whose work 
is to be watched. While perhaps this vague phrase is code for a 
generalized presidential authority to fire people, the Clause could 
just as easily be instructing the President to be careful, in some 
other way, that he follows the laws enacted by Congress.295 Indeed, 
if the Framers had wanted to convey specific rules for removal, 
there are clearer words they could have used, as the Constitution’s 
Appointments Clause readily illustrates.296 Constitutional text, 
then, provides little basis for a rule prohibiting implementation of 
federal law by state officials whom the President cannot fire.297 
Additionally, a crucial distinction exists between a joint federal-
state agency and the types of entities that have caused the U.S. 
Supreme Court to worry about the accountability consequences of 
 
292 Some scholars have advocated that position. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 249, 
at 596 (noting the President’s exclusive control to execute all federal laws means “all 
inferior executive officers act in his stead”). 
293 See Krotoszynski, supra note 253, at 1669 (“If Free Enterprise Fund means what it 
expressly says, however, cooperative-federalism programs violate the separation-of-powers 
doctrine by unconstitutionally exporting the execution of federal law to state-government 
officers.”). 
294 See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1835, 1836, 1838 (2016) (describing the clause’s language as “vague but modest,” and 
noting the Court’s tendency to use it as a “placeholder for more abstract and generalized 
reasoning” rather than as language to be interpreted). 
295 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and 
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 649–50 (1984) (noting several ways, other than 
exercising removal authority, in which the President could “take care” to ensure faithful law 
implementation); see also Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 
63–66 (2013) (questioning whether removal authority is an effective mechanism of ensuring 
accountability). 
296 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing specific limitations on the President’s 
appointment power).  
297 History provides little clarity. As others have noted, the Framers did not discuss 
removal authority at the Second Constitutional Convention, and for years after the 
founding, removal authority provoked vigorous debate. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 517 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining why 
history does not “offer significant help”). 
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limits on removal authority.298 Those concerns have emerged in 
cases involving an independent agency nested within another 
independent agency299 or in entities that blurred corporate and 
governmental boundaries.300 In those circumstances, no 
alternative source of elected-executive oversight compensated for 
the loss of presidential authority. In contrast, in a joint federal-
state agency, the commissioners—who are neither appointed nor 
removable by the President—would be appointed and removable 
by a governor. An accountability chain linking the agency officials 
to an executive official—and thus to voters—would remain; the 
chain would just link to a different executive and a smaller 
polity.301 And while the complexity of the administrative form 
might still create some voter confusion about authority and 
responsibility, that complexity is probably less than would exist 
with a traditional cooperative federalism regime, which the Court 
has already endorsed as constitutional.302 In short, the 
accountability emphasized in Free Enterprise Fund and analogous 
cases would remain. 
D. ARGUMENTS FROM CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND 
PURPOSE 
Even if a federal-state agency does not run afoul of some 
specific constitutional clause or existing precedent, a court might 
still deem it unconstitutional. Such a holding, if it occurred, would 
likely be grounded in the idea that broader principles—which are 
not explicitly stated in any specific clause but nevertheless emerge 
from the Constitution’s structure and history—forbid such a joint 
 
298 For a similar argument that “delegations to state entities fundamentally differ from 
those to private entities” in terms of accountability effects, see Krent, supra note 285, at 
2441. 
299 Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 497 (“If Congress can shelter the bureaucracy 
behind two layers of good-cause tenure, why not a third?”). 
300 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of American R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 55–56 (2015) (concerning 
Amtrak). 
301 See Krent, supra note 285, at 2445 (“In contrast to private entities, state officials are 
politically accountable. They remain subject to the checks and balances in the respective 
states and can be held to account by the electorate, or at least by their superiors within the 
state government.”). 
302 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 173–74 (1992) (upholding a cooperative 
federal-state program). 
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agency. Despite cogent critique of this sort of extra-textual 
interpretation,303 this interpretative method lies at the core of 
some of the U.S. Supreme Court’s most prominent federalism 
decisions and will likely recur.304 Additionally, even if broader 
constitutional principles do not lead to a stand-alone claim against 
a federal-state agency, they would likely inform a court’s 
interpretation of specific clauses and precedents.305 For these 
reasons, the discussion below addresses two potential arguments 
grounded in the Constitution’s structure and perceived purposes 
rather than in any specific clause. It also explains why neither of 
these arguments should gain traction and why a joint federal-state 
agency would advance, rather than thwart, constitutional values. 
1. Diminishing the States? The first broad-based constitutional 
argument would assert that a federal-state agency is 
constitutionally forbidden, or at least dubious, because it would 
compromise the power of the states. The anticipation of strong 
states is central to the Constitution; indeed, some modern rhetoric 
seems to suggest that federalism and state empowerment are 
interchangeable.306 Despite this anticipation, broad subject matter 
coverage and state dependence upon federal funding and expertise 
demonstrate the contemporary reality of sweeping federal 
authority.307 Given this pervasive federal authority, a skeptic of 
coequal federalism might argue that any arrangement that further 
compromises state independence—even an arrangement into 
which states willingly enter—is constitutionally dubious. 
 
303 See John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2008 (2009) (“When judges enforce freestanding 
‘federalism,’ they ignore the . . . bargains and tradeoffs that made their way into the 
document.”). 
304 See Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and Structural Argument, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1297, 
1314 (2019) (providing multiple examples of federalism cases with reasoning largely 
divorced from specific text). 
305 See id. at 1319–22 (describing and critiquing the textual hook approach).  
306 See Gil Seinfeld, Neglecting Nationalism, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 659, 660 (2019) (“If 
you ask the average law student—or lawyer, or judge, or legal scholar—for a quick account 
of what ‘federalism’ is, you are likely to get ‘states’ rights’ (or something very much like it) 
as an answer.”); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An 
Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 
743 (2000) (describing “honest federalism” as “true devotion to states’ rights federalism for 
its own sake”). 
307 See Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, supra note 19, at 1998–99 (arguing that much 
of state power now emerges within the domains of federal statutory regimes). 
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This argument has a superficial plausibility. We are 
accustomed to thinking of states as crucial, albeit fragile, partners 
in our federalist system,308 of government power as a zero-sum 
game,309 and of the federal government as an ever-expanding 
behemoth.310 Consequently, if the judiciary’s task is to keep the 
delicate state princesses safe from the rampaging federal dragon, 
keeping the two apart seems like a prudent first step.311 That 
paternalistic approach, however, would have two key flaws. 
First, the Constitution is not actually premised on the idea of 
protecting weak states from a strong federal government.312 The 
document’s core purpose was “to form a more perfect Union,”313 
which meant, in context, creating a more powerful and effective 
federal government than had existed under the Articles of 
Confederation.314 Its authors and adopters pursued that goal 
because they perceived the states as simultaneously enjoying too 
much authority and remaining perilously vulnerable, with that 
vulnerability arising because the absence of a strong federal 
government left the states dangerously exposed to both interstate 
 
308 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (warning that the Supremacy 
Clause gives the federal government “an extraordinary power in a federalist system,” which 
threatens to upset a “delicate balance”). 
309 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992) (“As the Federal 
Government’s willingness to exercise power within the confines of the Constitution has 
grown, the authority of the States has correspondingly diminished to the extent that federal 
and state policies have conflicted.”); Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism Past the Zero-Sum 
Game, 38 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 4, 4 (2012) (discussing the zero-sum model of federalism).  
310 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010) 
(describing “[t]he growth of the Executive Branch, which now wields vast power and 
touches almost every aspect of daily life”). 
311 The Court has made statements suggestive of such a principle, though in different 
factual contexts. E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997) (“It is an essential 
attribute of the States’ retained sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous 
within their proper sphere of authority.”). 
312 The Constitution was a delicate compromise between the anti-Federalists, who 
worried about excessive federal power and argued for strong states’ rights, and the 
Federalists, who supported stronger, centralized authority. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, 
supra note 73, at 69 (James Madison) (explaining that the Constitution formed “a happy 
combination” of national and state interests). For a discussion of the Founders’ focus on 
both national and state interests, see ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 145–56 (2010).  
313 U.S. Const. pmbl. 
314 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, supra note 73, at 16 (John Jay) (noting the importance of 
“a national government more wisely framed”).  
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conflict and foreign manipulation.315 A strong federal government 
was not the only goal, of course; the Framers clearly did not 
envision a federal government that would completely displace 
state authority.316 They anticipated that the states would remain 
strong, and they included measures designed to enhance that 
strength.317 But they envisioned state strength emerging partly 
through the empowerment of a robust federal government; as 
James Wilson explained, the states’ “respectability and power will 
increase with that of the general government.”318 Indeed, both 
Madison and Hamilton worried that the states might be a greater 
threat to the federal government than the federal government to 
the states.319 Equating federalism solely with state empowerment 
 
315 These concerns are central to many of the early Federalist Papers, which focus 
primarily on the individual states’ vulnerability to each other and to foreign manipulation. 
E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, supra note 73, at 23 (John Jay) (arguing that the federal 
government can check bordering states’ tendency toward war); THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, 
supra note 73, at 25 (John Jay) (warning that state rivalries could lead to foreign 
intervention); THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, supra note 73, at 49–55 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(warning again of destructive military rivalries between the states). 
316 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 568 (1985) (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (“In our federal system, the States have a major role that cannot be pre-empted 
by the National Government. As contemporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying 
conventions make clear, the States’ ratification of the Constitution was predicated on this 
understanding of federalism.”). 
317 See id. at 568–72 (describing the historical background of the Tenth Amendment). 
318 James Wilson, Speech, Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), in FRIENDS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF THE “OTHER” FEDERALISTS 1787–1788, at 240 (Colleen A. 
Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell, eds. 1998). 
319 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 73, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton) (warning 
against “[t]he inordinate pride of State importance”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 
73, at 213 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The Convention probably foresaw, what it has been a 
principle aim of these papers to inculcate, that the danger which most threatens our 
political welfare is that the State governments will finally sap the foundations of the 
Union.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 73, at 315 (James Madison) (“We have seen, 
in all the examples of ancient and modern confederacies, the strongest tendency continually 
betraying itself in the members, to despoil the general government of its authorities, with a 
very ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend itself against the encroachments.”). 
Hamilton also suggested that the People would be the most important referees of the 
balance of power between federal and state governments: 
[I]t is by far the safest course . . . to confine our attention wholly to the nature and 
extent of the powers as they are delineated in the Constitution. Every thing 
beyond this must be left to the prudence and firmness of the people; who, as they 
will hold the scales in their own hands, it is to be hoped, will always take care to 
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therefore is distinctly ahistorical; it would turn some of the key 
principles of the original document on their heads. 
The second flaw is that even if state empowerment is a binding 
constitutional principle, a joint arrangement—even one that 
involves relinquishing some authority and discretion—can 
enhance the efficacy of state governance.320 Sometimes efficacy will 
be improved because a partnership will empower the states to 
address problems they could not otherwise address on their own.321 
Sometimes it will be enhanced because the pooled expertise of 
multiple governance entities creates more administrative capacity 
than any single entity would have by working alone. Both 
possibilities reflect the broader insight, which is central to contract 
law, that the ability to enter into mutually binding arrangements 
is an element of independence and effectiveness, not the enemy of 
each.322 That principle explains why legal systems allow adults but 
not children to enter into binding contracts,323 or why the ability to 
enter into mutually-binding treaties is a key element of national 
sovereignty.324 Unless we assume that the states are incompetent 
to resist federal authority and must be protected from federal 
engagements by a strongly paternalistic constitutional principle, 
the ability to enter joint federal-state agencies should be a source 
of state empowerment. 
2. Diminishing the People? There is a second, and potentially 
more compelling, way in which constitutional structure and 
purpose might be marshalled to oppose a joint federal-state 
agency. This argument would concede that a joint federal-state 
 
preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the general and the State 
governments. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, supra note 73, at 204–05 (Alexander Hamilton). 
320 See supra Section III.E (outlining the advantages of joint governance). 
321 See supra notes 165–168 and accompanying text. 
322 See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 
88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 514 (1989) (describing contract theories grounded in individual 
autonomy); see also Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 
1448–49 (2004) (arguing that contracts should be understood as means of constructing 
relationships and communities). 
323 See Markovits, supra note 322, at 1461 n.103 (noting that our unwillingness to accord 
legal contracting authority to children “indicates a higher legal status” for contracting 
capacity). 
324 See Karl Loewenstein, Sovereignty and International Co-operation, 48 AM. J. INT’L. L. 
222, 225 (1954) (“Treaty-making is an act of sovereignty . . . .”). 
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agency could increase the efficacy of both federal and state 
governance and then assert that this increased efficacy is exactly 
the problem. The point of the U.S. Constitution, proponents would 
argue, is to maintain division and jealous competition between 
federal and state governments, and thus to empower the people. 
And if government unifies and grows stronger, the argument 
would suggest that the people grow correspondingly weaker, a 
result the Constitution implicitly forbids. Indeed, one might worry 
that when states and the federal government formally collude 
through a combined agency, the power of the government vis-à-vis 
individuals would be at its peak, and no state competition could 
quell this power.325 
Modern U.S. Supreme Court opinions would provide no 
shortage of fodder for this argument.326 A passage from Gregory v. 
Ashcroft327 illustrates this separate-to-empower idea, as well as its 
roots in the writings of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison: 
Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system 
is a check on abuses of government power. “The 
‘constitutionally mandated balance of power’ between 
the States and the Federal Government was adopted 
by the Framers to ensure the protection of ‘our 
fundamental liberties.’” . . . [A] healthy balance of 
power between the States and the Federal 
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse 
from either front. Alexander Hamilton explained to the 
people of New York, perhaps optimistically, that the 
 
325 See GREVE, supra note 88, at 11 (arguing that the Founders focused on “the welfare 
and liberty of individual citizens” and that modern federalism, which allows for competition 
among the states, fosters this welfare and liberty). 
326 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012) (“State 
sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties 
that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.” (quoting New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 181 (1992)); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (“This separation of 
the two spheres is one of the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty.”); United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (emphasizing the importance of division to the protection 
of liberty); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 571–72 (1985) (Powell, 
J., dissenting) (emphasizing the states’ role as “counterpoise” to federal power, and 
asserting that the “constitutionally mandated balance of power between the States and the 
Federal Government” is “designed to protect our fundamental liberties”). 
327 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
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new federalist system would suppress completely “the 
attempts of the government to establish a tyranny”: 
 “[I]n a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, 
may be said to be entirely the masters of their own 
fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the 
general government will at all times stand ready to 
check the usurpations of the state governments, and 
these will have the same disposition towards the 
general government. The people, by throwing 
themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it 
preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, 
they can make use of the other as the instrument of 
redress.”328  
Under this reasoning, a genuinely joint federal-state agency 
might well be a bridge too far. But there are problems with 
treating this argument as a binding constitutional principle rather 
than just as a background concern. 
The first problem is that opposing principles also emerge from 
both the constitutional text and surrounding rhetoric. The 
Framers clearly wanted to maintain the people’s sovereignty over 
the government, but they also wanted a robust government; they 
repeatedly noted that a government that struggles in its 
administration would be of service to no one.329 As Hamilton 
explained, “I am much mistaken, if experience has not wrought a 
deep and solemn conviction in the public mind, that greater energy 
of government is essential to the welfare and prosperity of the 
community.”330 They also planned for many ways, including the 
creation of the Electoral College and the provisions for state 
appointment of senators, in which federal and state governance 
would be intertwined.331 While the Constitution itself does not 
 
328 Id. at 458–59 (second alteration in original) (first quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. 
Scanlon, 478 U.S. 234, 242 (1985); then quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 180–81 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
329 THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra note 73, at 155 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Not to confer in 
each case a degree of power commensurate to the end, would be to violate the most obvious 
rules of prudence and propriety, and improvidently to trust the great interests of the nation 
to hands which are disabled from managing them with vigor and success.”). 
330 THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, supra note 73, at 171 (Alexander Hamilton). 
331 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (providing for state legislatures to choose Senators); 
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speak of joint federal and state administration of the laws,332 some 
of the Framers’ writings anticipate joint administration taking 
place, particularly with respect to tax collection.333 These clauses 
and writings suggest that the Framers anticipated that states and 
the federal government would interact as both collaborators and 
rivals, not exclusively as one or the other. Equally important, the 
Constitution contains no provision forbidding joint federal and 
state administration of the laws, though clearly it could have done 
so.  
Additionally, creating a joint entity would not unify federal and 
state governance into a harmonious whole. State-appointed agency 
officials still would advocate and vote for state-supported 
positions, and federal officials would do the same, as both would be 
appointed and subject to removal by their respective political 
leaders.334 In all likelihood, the commissioners’ disagreements 
would be memorialized in written dissents, increasing the 
transparency of conflicts.335 In some matters, strong disagreement 
among the state and federal members of the agencies would lead to 
gridlock and leave no majority vote winner. Furthermore, because 
state and federal participation within these agencies would be 
entirely voluntary, states could simply exit the regime as the 
ultimate expression of their dissent.336 Just as cooperative 
 
Electoral College, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2113–19 (2001) (describing the origins of the 
Electoral College). The Seventeenth Amendment replaced legislative appointment with 
popular elections, but that later action does not change the basic point that the Framers 
were not attached to a principle of strict federal-state separation. See U.S. CONST. amend. 
XVII. 
332 Many commentators have noted that the Constitution says little at all about 
administration. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 263, at 12–13 (citing earlier treatises that 
made this observation). 
333 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, supra note 73, at 233–34 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(noting that the national legislature can make use of the “system of each State within that 
State” to collect taxes); see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 945–47 (1997) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (summarizing these writings). 
334 See supra notes 242–244 and accompanying text. 
335 See Sharon B. Jacobs, Administrative Dissents, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 612–13 
(2017) (noting that separate opinions offer a unique glimpse into commission 
decisionmaking and commissioner preferences). 
336 For example, New Jersey withdrew from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative—
which lacks a federal representative, but otherwise resembles a federal-state agency—when 
that state’s politics turned more conservative, although the state later re-joined the 
initiative. See H.J. Mai, New Jersey Adopts Rules to Rejoin RGGI, Heading to 100% Clean 
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federalism sometimes provides a clearly-defined forum for federal-
state conflict, so too would a joint federal-state agency often 
provide a forum for intergovernmental contestation.337 And the 
people of the nation and the states, through their elected 
representatives, would still retain authority over the joint 
enterprise, as well as the option to urge their leaders to leave it 
entirely.338 
In summary, a joint federal-state agency should be 
constitutional, although not every defense explored here would be 
a sure win. One could (as some litigants have done) easily 
manufacture an argument from some Justices’ unitary executive, 
federalism, and anti-administrative rhetoric that joining federal 
and state power in a single entity is unconstitutional.339 But once 
one moves past the rhetorical flourishes and examines 
constitutional text, the structure of the document, the intentions of 
the Framers, and judicial precedent, it becomes apparent that 
nothing in the Constitution forbids such an arrangement. And 
while some of the Court’s contemporary jurisprudence reflects a 
deep unease with novel and creative administrative 
arrangements,340 the sort of innovation we describe here reflects 
the spirit of the Constitution itself. The document was designed to 
produce a thriving nation through the combined, and sometimes 
innovative, efforts of federal and state governments. It reflects, in 
James Madison’s words, the “manly spirit” that, while not opposed 
to “decent regard to the opinions of former times and other 
nations,” prevented the American people from allowing “a blind 
veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the 
suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own 
situation, and the lessons of their own experience.”341 The 
Constitution thus empowers the political branches of federal and 
state government to do more with joint federal-state agencies. 
 
Energy by 2050, UTILITY DIVE (June 18, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/new-
jersey-adopts-rules-to-rejoin-rggi-heading-to-100-clean-energy-by-205/557078/. 
337 See generally Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 19 (describing the frequency of 
conflict within cooperative federalism regimes). 
338 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
339 See supra notes 237, 251, 289–290 and accompanying text. 
340 See Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (2017) (noting recent cases demonstrating skepticism towards 
“administratively novel arrangements”). 
341 THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, supra note 73, at 94 (James Madison). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For years, federalism debates have pitted advocates of 
separation against advocates of overlap. While the advocates of 
separation can find ample support in U.S. Supreme Court rhetoric 
and have gained some traction in the Court’s holdings, the overlap 
advocates make a persuasive case that cooperation is both an 
inevitable and often positive feature of our governance systems. 
But their persuasive arguments raise a host of additional issues, 
all centering on two basic questions. First, how can a federalist 
system structure overlap to produce successful and efficient 
governance rather than a duplicative, conflict-ridden mess? 
Second, even if a proposed structure makes sense as policy, would 
it be constitutional? 
This Article has proposed an innovative answer to these 
questions. A joint federal-state agency would avoid some of the 
divided decisionmaking problems that plague dual federalist 
structures. It also would avoid some of the issues of multi-state 
coordination and multi-layered delegation that affect cooperative 
federalism regimes. More generally, it would provide a forum for 
federal-state and multi-state dialogue. And, as we have explained, 
it would be constitutional. We do not argue that joint agencies 
would solve all problems of governance structure in a federalist 
system; no governance structure can fulfill that tall order. But 
joint agencies’ potential justifies more extensive use. 
 
